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Abstract 
This thesis examines the strengths and weaknesses of Indonesia’s hegemony-building. 
Qualitative research is carried out on three levels of analysis – the domestic, regional 
and global. The author has reformulated Pedersen’s (2002) three capacities to be 
indicative of regional hegemony-building: the domestic, ideational and international 
capacity. The study finds that Indonesia’s regional hegemony-building is weakened by 
its domestic capacity. Despite a strong ideational capacity, on a regional level this does 
not translate into strong hegemonic capacity. On a global level, the capacity is 
quantitatively bigger, yet marginal in effect. The thesis concludes that regional 
hegemony discourse should focus on the embryonic capacities of hegemony-building 
instead of trying to fit emerging regional powers into pre-existing strategies of regional 
hegemony.  
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Introduction 
Broadly speaking, hegemony is known as a type of supremacy, a power far more 
capable than others, asserting its power over others, be it politically, militarily, 
economically or culturally. The easiest example that can be conjured when thinking of 
the word ’hegemony’, is the United States as a superpower, a global hegemon, referred 
to as such already in 19041. However, conventional and non-conventional theories of 
international relations have used (and abused2) the concept of hegemony without the 
latter becoming an integral part of any of them. Debates and conceptualisation date back 
over 50 years, yet the application of hegemony is lacking in method. Concepts such as 
hegemons, hegemony, hegemonic leaders, hegemonic (global and regional) powers (and 
many more) are used interchangeably.  
Furthermore, global theories and conceptualisations of hegemony do not necessarily 
refer to (or apply to) regional hegemony. I share the same dissatisfaction with 
hegemony discourse as Prys (2010). The hegemonic canon has been long dominated by 
global hegemony, with only two approaches to hegemony in international relations 
recognised as theories of hegemony, the neo-Gramscian approach and the Hegemonic 
Stability Theory. Applying theories of global hegemony to regions (i.e. regional 
powers) seems as arbitrary as discussing institution-building in regions outside of 
Europe with regard to the integration theories of the European Union. The logic here is 
not to take a ’hegemonic discourse’ and apply it freely to other regions of the world, but 
to find a contextually relevant, yet theoretically sustainable approach. Furthermore, 
applying global theories to regional empirics seems arbitrary, as it discards systemic and 
external pressures that regional hegemonies face, and global ones do not. Also, regional 
hegemons as rising regional powers, mostly in the Global South, carry a legacy of state 
formation that has left them internally vulnerable, with the processes of nation-building 
still ongoing (Dannreuther, 2007).  
To date, there has not been sufficient research that examines the embryonic levels of 
hegemony-building in the Third World countries. Hegemony in this regard establishes a 
useful, if somewhat conceptually overloaded space for further analysis of regional 
                                                          
1 Online Etymology Dictionary (2015). Hegemony. 
2 Applied carelessly 
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hegemony. Critical engagement with previous work will help in navigating the 
(regional) hegemony problematic and provide a basis for the analysis of regional 
hegemony. Moreover, seeing that regional hegemonies are regional powers on the rise, 
the definition of (rising) regional powers is consulted.  
In the words of Snidal (1985), the author is looking for “a theoretical filler to plug the 
gaps between a static theory and the empirical reality.” Not all behaviours that can be 
deemed hegemonic lead to a hegemonic outcome – becoming a hegemon. Analysing 
regional hegemony mixes patterns of ontological and causal nature. In order to become 
a regional hegemon, one has to show capacity to act like one, this capacity is utilised by 
action (what the would-be regional hegemon makes of this capacity) that is then subject 
to interpretation by others in the region (whether they accept these actions on behalf of 
the hegemon or not). However, across cases of regional hegemony there seems to be a 
‘capacity-expectations’ gap3. In the logic of Prys (2010), a regional hegemon cannot be 
detected by simply looking at the largest state in the region. This thesis entails to 
intercept the process of becoming a hegemon by analysing the capacity aspect of a 
(potential) hegemon. This conceptualisation is also informed of the problem of later 
operationalisation, were the categories of a potential regional hegemon’s strategies to 
turn out too narrow and static.   
Aim and Scope of the Study 
The aim of the research is to establish what are Indonesia’s strengths and weaknesses in 
hegemonic capacity. I will analyse Indonesia through three capacities – ideational, 
domestic and international – reformulated from the work of Pedersen (2002). By 
analysing Indonesia, the largest state in the Southeast Asian region, who, despite its size 
credentials has not attained regional hegemony, I conclude what hinders and what aids 
its commitment to hegemony. The underlying logic of this thesis is that the projection of 
capacities, indicative of commitment, sees the legitimation from others necessary for a 
regional hegemon. However, when capacity is weak, hegemony-building stalls.  
This thesis does not attest to a single theory. However, some underlying notions are 
derived from the constructivist and English school theorists. The author has been 
                                                          
3 Prys (2010) refers to this as an ’achievement-expectations’ gap; the European Union discourse features a 
’capabilites-expectations’ gap, e.g. , Hill (1993), Ginsberg (1999). 
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inspired by Acharya and Stubbs theorising on Southeast Asian relations. Firstly, the 
state remains the central actor, although not in a realist, but in a Wendtian sense – states 
are primary actors, but not the only actors. Secondly, the agency of local actors counts 
for more than neorealists accredit it with. Coupling agency with sovereignty in the 
Southeast Asian sense can be best explained by constructivists who deal with norms, 
identity, institutions and interests. The English School theory offers explanations on 
order and the structure of the international system for a multi-level analysis. (Acharya & 
Stubbs, 2006) 
The scope of the study is further determined by the methodology of a case study and the 
three levels of analysis, adapted from the work of Buzan and Waever (2003), modified 
for the purpose of this thesis as domestic, regional and global, which I will elaborate on 
in chapter 2. 
Limitations 
The research is narrowed down to an emphasis on hegemony as cooperative leadership, 
preferring benign not coercive measures, and leading, not dominating others. Other 
types of powerhood, especially the realist understanding of hegemony derived from 
military capabilities, are mentioned, yet not taken as a basis of this thesis. 
Furthermore, even though the underlying notions of hegemony, such as power and 
legitimacy, are discussed, these will not be individually analysed. For example, I will 
not examine the extent to which others have legitimised the potential hegemon, as this 
would entail a multi-actor analysis too extensive in scope for a Master’s thesis analysing 
Indonesia. 
In other words, the emphasis is on identifying Indonesia’s strengths and weaknesses 
regarding hegemony-building and seeing how these affect its capacities to pursue 
regional leadership (hegemony).  
Significance of the study 
One intended outcome of the study, on the theoretical level, is to identify a set of pre-
capacities relating to a regional hegemon and its commitment. On a practical level, the 
study aims to clarify the concept of (regional) hegemony by analysing Indonesia in a 
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theoretically embedded context which allows for ‘Asian exceptionalism’ based on 
historicism and regional and national intricacies to be turned into ‘Asian universalism’4.  
Overview 
This thesis consists of four main chapters. In the first chapter, I trace the theory of 
hegemony resulting in a theoretical framework for the study of regional hegemony. I 
discuss the theories of hegemony currently existing in the study of international 
relations to guide my enquiry into the underlying notions of hegemony, which I then use 
to conceptualise hegemony. In tying global hegemony to regional hegemony, I turn to 
the concept of regional power, indicating its ontology as well as the weaknesses and 
opportunities it faces in becoming a regional hegemon. Finally, I will formulate a 
theoretical framework for analysing the capacities of regional hegemony which are 
consistent with the presumptions that both the notions of hegemony and (rising) 
regional powers entail. 
In the second chapter, I present my chosen methodology. Firstly, I will indicate the pros 
and cons of case study and why I have chosen to do within-case study. Secondly, I will 
elaborate on why I have chosen Indonesia as the case study. I will then explain how I 
have gathered the data to be used in the qualitative research and what possible 
implications I have observed when first sourcing and later working with the data. 
Lastly, I will present my analytical framework in three levels of analysis to indicate how 
I have systemised the empirics. 
In the third chapter, I present the data gathered through a ‘security lens’5 on the three 
levels of analysis in the case of Indonesia. I will look at the historic notions of 
Indonesia’s statehood and foreign policy, the transition to democracy and Muslim 
politics and radicalism. At the regional level I will introduce the norms shared in 
ASEAN, conflict mediation, agenda-setting and the principle of ‘ASEAN centrality’. 
Thirdly, I will investigate the global level relating to Indonesia’s hegemonic capacity, 
including engagement with China and the United States and in global institutions.  
                                                          
4 The latter has been argued for by Acharya and Buzan (2007). 
5 See the emphasis on security in the Third World in Ayoob (1991). 
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In the fourth chapter, I will summarise the weaknesses and strengths of Indonesia’s 
hegemony-building with regard to the three capacities derived from the theory to be 
indicative of potential hegemony. By doing that I aim to answer what the strengths and 
weaknesses of Indonesia’s hegemony-building are and draw conclusions for the study 
of regional hegemony. 
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1. Theory 
1.1 Theoretical background 
1.1.1 Theories of Hegemony in International Relations 
Andreas Antoniades (2008) has summarised the two existing, what might be called 
theories of hegemony in international relations – the Hegemonic Stability Theory and 
neo-Gramscian notions of hegemony (Cox’s seminal work on Gramsci). The latter 
presupposes legitimacy; the former does not require legitimacy per se.  
Conventional approaches towards international relations maintain that military 
capabilities translating into gains in power create a disequilibrium where one state 
prevails and becomes a hegemon. This sits nicely with the realist understanding of an 
anarchic backdrop where states fend for themselves based on a strict self-help (and self-
preservation) mentality. Drawing from economics, this disequilibrium translates into 
hegemonic stability theory which maintains that a hegemon is needed for continued 
stability6. A single state, a possible hegemon, pursues goals that others find useful in an 
absolute-relative gains dichotomy. Following Kindleberger’s logic, Webb and Krasner 
(1989) state that ”only a hegemon has sufficient power and motivation to provide the 
public good of international economic stability by its own actions.“ 
Gilpin (1988) challenges this statement, bringing it back to mainstream security realism, 
asking whether this stability maintained by a hegemon translates into peace in a region. 
He, too, retains that ’different growth of power between states is what defines 
international relations’ and by investigating Thucydides concludes that the ’structure of 
the international system is provided by distribution of power among states’. A state’s 
successes, however, are not only determined by its politico-military power and 
outcomes. Gilpin fails to address what a hegemonic state does in an attempt to regulate 
international relations and maintain stability besides being an unchallenged power. 
Clark (2009), drawing on Layne and Keohane, notes material accounts of hegemony not 
to leave space for the conception of legitimacy. If material capabilities are seen as 
                                                          
6 Note here that disequilibrium and stability are not opposites, stability is defined here as something not 
likely to change. Disequilibrium is stable when it is firmly established and asymmetry accepted as the 
status quo. 
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having primordial importance, the space for the conception of legitimacy to form is 
automatically removed; things are no longer negotiable, but simply given. It is worth 
noting that the theory has not stood up well to empirical testing.7 
Legitimacy appears in the neo-Gramscian notions derived from the works of Antonio 
Gramsci, the leader of the Italian Communist Party. Cox (1983) cautions the reader to 
reflect on the selectivity of deriving ideas from Gramsci, adding that, Gramsci was a 
thinker reflecting on his own time, historicism cannot be ever avoided; writers write in 
their own time. Cox has divided Gramsci’s conceptualisation of hegemony into two 
debates: first one resulting from a revolutionary strategy for a socialist state, the second 
from Machiavelli. Gramsci borrows from Machiavelli the idea of power (and hegemony 
as a type of power) as a centaur. There needs to be dominance achieved and/or 
maintained by coercion and leadership obtained and maintained by consensus. The first 
conceptualisation that Gramsci is most concerned about, relates to a group within a 
state, although Gramsci understands the necessity for the underpinnings of a 
corresponding political structure in civil society, if his plan of having subordinates and 
providing them with concessions which lead to forms of social democracy is to work. 
Machiavelli, too, is concerned with what happens within the state, finding support for a 
united Italy, however, Cox argues that applying Machiavelli frees the Gramscian notion 
from its initial class-ties, allowing for a wider application to relations of dominance, 
subordination and world order. In conclusion, hegemony can be said to be an ongoing 
dialogue (a quest to seeking consensus) between the support base and the dominant, 
coercive (but only in marginal, deviating cases) leader.8  
In conclusion, hegemony has been linked to power and legitimacy which stems from the 
hegemon providing goods or benefits by maintaining an order9. Provisional goods, for 
example, range from security arrangements to a prosperous economic order. I will 
consequently present how this thesis conceptualises the underlying notions of power 
and legitimacy before turning to the concept of regional hegemony more specifically. 
                                                          
7 See Snidal (1985) and Grunberg (1990). 
8 Machiavelli has been used by Nye (1990) to indicate the difference between hard and soft power.  
Machiavellian skills (hard power) include sizing up the competition, setting exacting standards, whereas 
organisational skills (soft power) include being a leader that manages not only delegates. A combination 
of the two is referred to as smart power. 
9 Order here refers to a set of norms and rules that form the behavioural basis of and order the constituents 
of a system. 
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1.1.2 Hegemony as power 
Hegemony has been equated with power, however, the existence of great power 
capacity does not determine a potential hegemon. Watson (2007:90) has argued, 
similarly to neorealists, for the ‘material conditions of technological, economic and 
strategic superiority to constitute a group of powers or a great power’ “to bring such 
great inducements and pressures to bear that most other states lose some of their 
external and internal independence.” Snidal (1985), in his critique of the Hegemonic 
Stability Theory, points to similar types of hegemonies10 – benign and exercised by 
persuasion relating to inducements and benign but exercised by coercion relating to 
pressures. Both types aim to generate interest in and have the capabilities to influence 
others. This does not, however, mean that a hegemon necessarily has to coerce via 
military threats. Bull (1982) has said that a hegemonic power has the option of not 
resorting to force, thus not needing to exercise superiority, or even be superior to others, 
given that other constituents of the system provide the military dimension. This can also 
be interpreted as an inter-level exchange; a hegemonic power in a region can act 
benevolently, given that ‘hard power’ is externally attainable from other constituents of 
the international system. 
Strange (1990) divides power into two categories: structural and relational. Even though 
her division is derived from the conduct (different modes, means and channels) of the 
U.S. and Japan in international political economy, Strange raises a powerful analogy for 
the research conducted in this thesis – a relational power, aware of the pressures of a 
structural power, has in some issues and for some purposes more influence than the 
structural power. Hart and Jones (2010) agree that emerging powers, despite (or due to) 
not carrying the economic and military heft or flag of innovation, have managed to 
become forces to be reckoned with due to their substantial multilateral weight in 
regional issues.  
Power is never absolute. Hart and Jones (2010) relay Baldwin’s (1979) ‘paradox of 
unrealised power’, “the fact that material capabilities and power over specific outcomes 
rarely approach the 1:1 ratio.” Although the role of material capabilities as a potential 
anterior variable is acknowledged, power, similarly to hegemony, requires more than 
                                                          
10 The third dynamic of coercive and exploitative behaviour referring to domination not hegemony. 
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just resources. According to Tellis et al (2001), state power is perceived at three levels: 
material resources, the ability of the state to use these resources for defined political 
purposes, and the influence over outcomes. They further emphasise the point of the 
utility of power depending on its purpose and on the target at which it is directed.  
Similarly to Wendt’s (1992) argument that anarchy is what states make of it, power, too, 
is what states make of it.11 The ability of states to use resources to influence outcomes 
presupposes the existence of said resources. In the author’s view hegemony is aided, but 
not determined by material power. This, however, does not mean that the notion of 
domestic capacity taken to influence outcomes is wrong. On the contrary, strong 
domestic capacity allows for the projection of a hegemon’s power.  
1.1.3 Legitimacy in hegemony 
States are not solitary actors, thus, what states make of their power is encouraged or 
restrained by other constituents12 of the system. Legitimacy can be determined by how 
the hegemon engages its subordinates and the latter respond. Watson (2007:20) utilises 
hegemony as dialogue, stating that the exercise of hegemony ”involves continual 
dialogue between the hegemonial authority and other states, and a sense on both sides of 
the balance of expediency.“ Watson continues by saying that ”hegemonial authority 
carries with it privileges but also responsibilities“ and ”derives additional advantages by 
making the exercise of hegemony acceptable to other members of the society“ (Watson 
2007:58). In saying that he agrees with Bull (1980:446) that ”great powers cannot 
expect to be conceded special rights, if they do not perform special duties.“ The 
metaphor of ‘an ongoing dialogue’ offers more leeway in recognising embryonic 
hegemonic conduct by not immediately dismissing leaders who might not enjoy 
constant legitimation (acceptance of one’s conduct), seeing that special duties require 
more capacity than a regional power might have.  
The outcomes that a hegemon produces can be said to directly link to legitimacy, the 
possible benefits of the order propagated by the hegemon contribute to this. Parsons 
(1966) suggests that through socialisation subordinates acquire sets of values that 
motivate them to agree to the order and norms that the potential hegemon adheres to 
                                                          
11 Play on words that includes both what a state makes of its power and what others make of it, effectively 
combining both the relativity of power and its legitimation. 
12 Constituents in this thesis refer mostly to other states and institutions. 
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itself.  Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990), having explored historical case studies of U.S. 
diplomacy after World War I and II and the British colonial experience in India and 
Egypt, bring together the notions of power and legitimacy, and link legitimate 
domination at the international level with legitimacy at the domestic level in their theory 
of socialisation. This added dimension of hegemony, according to the authors, “can also 
explain why the ordering principles and norms of a given system are not isomorphic 
with changes in the relative distribution of military and economic capability within that 
system.” Although Ikenberry and Kupchan maintain that socialisation is triggered by 
coercion13 and material inducements, they acknowledge the value of norms, the role of 
which is most prevalent when hegemony is descending.  
Ougaard (1988) has identified two dimensions of hegemony that relate to power – its 
utilisation and legitimation via outcomes acceptable to others and the consequent 
order/regime produced. Out of his two dimensions of preponderance and control over 
outcomes, I focus on the latter. Ougaard makes a point of distinguishing harmony and 
identity of interests from hegemony, stressing that conflicts that arise (between a 
hegemon and its subordinates) should not be dismissed; it is the extent of the hegemon 
prevailing more than not in managing conflicting interests that should be considered a 
criterion. Ougaard has offered three possible types of change leading to a declining of 
hegemony:  
1. the alliance could face difficulties created by change; 
2. the hegemon’s interests could become less compatible with those of others; 
3. changes could occur in the hegemon’s own set of interests, leading to 
incompatibility between the domestic level and the goals pursued.  
In this sense, hegemony as legitimacy can be seen as a continuous dialogue between the 
hegemon and its subordinates, thus allowing for a theoretical space not to immediately 
dismiss potential hegemony when subordinates dismiss a hegemon’s set of values or 
show dissatisfaction with the order it is promoting14. However, hegemony requires a 
constant line of communication between the hegemon and its subordinates. Thus, 
                                                          
13 Meant as a manipulation of provisional goods. 
14 In a Habermasian sense, support can be either specific or diffuse, but that does not negate the existence 
of legitimacy, see Kivimäki (1993). 
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legitimation requires commitment capacity to communication on behalf of the hegemon 
to engage with its subordinates and subject itself to legitimation.  
1.1.4 Regional Powers 
In order to assess the capacity of regional powers in becoming regional hegemons, the 
literature on regional powers is analysed. Literature on regional (and middle, emerging) 
powers has mostly dealt with contextually defined ontologies. Theories of regional 
hegemonies have not been rooted in the main IR theories (Pedersen, 2002). The 
discourse focuses on middle powers and emerging (great) powers, also equated to 
regional powers. Among the most common regional powers investigated are the BRICS 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) countries, leading to the understanding that 
how powers in a region conduct their business internationally varies greatly, as authors 
writing on regional powers usually, partly or mostly, focus on the historicism of a 
region15. Therefore, it is of no wonder that there are only few frameworks for the 
systemic analysis of regional hegemony. According to Nolte (2010), regional powers 
have to meet various conditions: 
“1. The internal dynamics of such a state should allow it to play a stabilising and 
leading role in its region; 
2. Such a state should indicate and demonstrate its willingness, and of course also its 
capacity or ability, to assume the role of regional leader, stabiliser and, if not 
peacekeeper, at least peacemaker; 
3. Should be acceptable to its neighbours – the members of the security complex in 
which it operates – as a leader responsible for regional security. A broader, or extra-
regional acceptance is perhaps a necessary condition, but not necessary, even if 
supported and promoted by big powers.” 
Following Nolte, a regional power’s domestic situation might change to the extent that 
it cannot act as a hegemon anymore or is not viewed as one by subordinate states. 
Similarly, the state’s foreign policy rhetoric might change to discard the role of a 
hegemon. The domestic level is especially important in the light of new regional powers 
still engaged in nation-building; many of the countries in the South still face weaknesses 
                                                          
15 See regional hegemony literature on the BRICS countries, for example Iyob (1993), Turner (1991). 
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stemming from the historic legacy of colonisation; having been under colonial rule, 
borders were drawn arbitrarily and thus a low state capacity seems to still be a norm in 
the Global South especially (Dannreuther, 2007). The domestic level is not of 
immediate importance for a global hegemon, yet to emphasise Ikenberry and Kupchan’s 
view, a strong domestic hegemon can better socialise its subordinates, indicating the 
need to study hegemony on a domestic level. Moreover, the ‘capabilities-expectations’ 
gap drawn from the literature on the European Union offers some insight into how 
external factors cannot operate without internal capacities, seeing as it is difficult to 
change the status quo embedded in institutions or imposed by external actors to the 
region (Hill, 1993). Still, Hill (1993) concludes by saying that “cooperation [with 
others] is inevitable and desirable” in order to help close the ‘capabilities-expectations’ 
gap. 
In order to engage with legitimising subordinates, Nolte (2010) accords the role of 
international institutions a primary role in regional power strategies. Institutions bring 
about and help maintain a certain order accepted by all, thus a hegemon operating 
within an institutional context is legitimised by the constraint that the commitment to 
the institution presupposes. Furthermore, it ‘solidifies’ commitments. Hurd (2008:78-9) 
sees hegemony as power constrained as „the strong subscribing to a minimum standard 
of compliance with the legitimized rule or institution and therefore the strong may be 
induced to alter their behaviour by the effects of legitimated rules,“ which in turn 
appeases the worries of domination of the subordinates. Hurrell (1995), in tying the role 
of a regional hegemon strongly with that of institutionalisation, highlights that an 
extremely dominant (not coercive) power might make institutional cooperation 
unnecessary, thus some ascendancy of hegemony is needed for the hegemon to 
legitimise its position and pursue its interests. 
These views correlate with those of liberal institutionalists, to whom institutions matter 
greatly. From the perspective of hegemony, institutions offer a theoretical win-win 
situation for both the subordinates and the hegemon. Subordinates may rest assured that 
institutions ’tie down’ the hegemon, at the same time, an influential state can use 
institutions as a platform to further diffuse its ideas and pursue its interests. Deudney 
and Ikenberry (1999) refer to this type of ‘golden caging’ as ‘security co-binding’ – 
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“attempts (by states) to tie one another down by locking each other into institutions that 
are mutually constraining.”16 
In further defining and conceptualising ‘followership’ needed to legitimise regional 
powers and looking for strategies to do so, Nolte (2010) stumbles by equating the 
regional power’s plan of action to institutionalisation.17 Hurrell (1995) and Pedersen 
(2002) also hold the opportunities that institutions allow for to be the most cost-
effective and reliable instruments for hegemony. As a starting point, engagement in 
institutions seems logical in signalling to the subordinates the regional hegemon’s 
commitment and intentions.  
However, regional hegemony can also look further than the regional level to legitimise 
its actions, especially in cases where regional institutions do not afford the hegemon 
with a notable platform to diffuse its ideas, something that Pedersen (2002) holds 
important. In Pedersen’s view the interests and strategies of the biggest state in the 
region can also explain the most important aspects of regional endeavours. He makes a 
logical case for accepting engagement in region-, institution-building as that of 
reflecting a potential hegemon. ‘Institutions alleviate the fears of unequal gains and 
mitigate fears of cheating’, when hegemony is subdued, it can be legitimised more 
freely by subordinate states, at the same time a big power wins in an arena for the 
diffusion of its ideas. 
Although engagement in institutions is not the only possible strategy for a regional 
hegemon, it offers an arena for further investigation of regional hegemony, as 
institutions bring together regional and international players. This, however, raises the 
question whether a regional hegemon has explicit ambitions only at the regional level. 
Power aggregation in a Hobbesian world would entail that regional great powers use 
regional institutions as a stepping stone to gain international prestige and become more 
                                                          
16 For a critique on institutions, see Mearsheimer „The False Promise of Institutions.“ Wendt, alluding to 
Krasner’s autonomy of regimes, has referred to liberal institutionalists as „realists before liberals, since 
only if international institutions can change powers and interests [perceptions of intent pertaining to the 
former’s utility] do they go beyond the “limits“ of realism.“ 
17 Power is not (only) based on material resources, but is here considered to be a dialogue between those 
affording the state its status in relation to their own power. 
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than a regional hegemon18. The global role conception and ambitions of a regional 
power thus also offer some insight into regional hegemony.  
1.2 Regional Hegemony 
There are many conceptual issues which stem from the mixing of two totally different 
concepts of ‘hegemony’ and ‘region’ in the realm of IR. In recent years, writers like 
Prys (2010) and Destradi (2010) have undertaken the great task of conceptually 
clarifying and classifying regional hegemony and its strategies, respectively.  
Destradi’s view on strategies seems to be too narrow for the purpose of this thesis. It is 
not in the scope of this thesis or in the interest of its author to see a regional hegemon 
fitted in pre-existing categories of hegemonic strategy. Furthermore, the author finds 
Destradi’s division of hegemony and leadership arbitrary. It is true that hegemony and 
leadership, when used interchangeably, have been used somewhat negligently, not 
accounting for the basic assumptions of either (first relating primarily to power and 
legitimacy, the latter to the more sociological aspects of engaging a group19). Destradi 
argues that there is a fundamental difference between hegemony and leadership, with 
the former only acting on its own self-interest, and the latter leading a group in 
realisation of their common goals. However, what Destradi describes as a leadership, 
can still be viewed as hegemony, if common goals overlay with the self-interests of the 
hegemon in question20. What is more, Destradi’s construction of leadership is zero-sum 
in nature, built on unanimous agreement among followers, leaving no room for 
disagreement on the followers’ side or possibility of weakened, unattractive leadership 
without losing said position in the group. In this sense, the concept of hegemony, taken 
to include strategies of political leadership, offers more leeway. Leadership also fits the 
underlying notions conceptualised in earlier chapters – the relational power, managing 
an order and the consequent legitimation.  
                                                          
18 By saying this, the author of this thesis is not trying to subject regional hegemony to being lesser than a 
middle power or a would-be great power, with regard to power these concepts overlap.   
19 See Young’s (1991) three types of individual leadership. 
20 Destradi (2010) also alludes to this by saying that „a hegemon might initiate a socialisation process 
with the aim of realising its own objectives, but in a second stage the adoption of its norms and values by 
subordinate states leads to a commonality of ends and interests, thereby transforming subordinates into 
followers,“ implying the existence of a leader.  This seems more of a semantic distinction in the field of 
international relations, in which case leadership is married with hegemony for the purpose of this thesis.  
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For the purpose of this thesis, the author entails leadership to be indicative of 
hegemony. The author plans to bring closer together the fields of leadership and 
hegemony by showing that the latter can be effectively operationalised by the former; 
Leadership is essentially conceptualised as an activity, as stated by Nabers (2010).  
Even though the material preponderance is a strong anterior variable, providing the base 
for potential hegemony, leadership in the sense of hegemony should be studied 
independently from material power, as Wiener (1995) suggests. Furthermore, it fits 
nicely with the original meaning of hegemony. Derived from the Greek word 
hegemonia, taken to mean “leadership, a leading the way, a going first”, which in turn is 
derived from hegeisthai “to lead,” perhaps originally “to track down, seek, trace”. 21 The 
etymology further indicates its dynamic make-up; if ‘seeking’ something leads to 
‘hegemony’, then the author, too, is tracing the capacity indicative of hegemony. 
1.3 Theoretical framework 
The concept of hegemony as leadership marries well with Pedersen’s theory on 
cooperative hegemony. Pedersen’s (2002) contribution, although viewed by him not as 
a theory of regional hegemony, connects the role of the hegemon to the extent of 
regionalism that can be viewed in a region. In Pedersen’s opinion, ‘international 
hegemony accords institutions a much too limited role’, opting to focus on the role of 
institutions. Pedersen has been criticised by Prys as being too narrowly focused on 
institutionalisation, the same critique befalls Hurrell and Nolte (Prys, 2010).  However, 
Pedersen’s further elaboration on a theory of co-operative hegemony, albeit embedded 
in regionalism and institutionalisation, offers pre-conditions for co-operative hegemony 
that can be adapted to the three levels of analysis (domestic, regional, global) of this 
thesis. Cooperative hegemony entails soft rule within and through co-operative 
arrangements based on a long-term strategy (Pedersen, 2002).  Long-term strategy 
entails capacity to project hegemony. Although, Pedersen, too, has adopted to generalise 
on the basis of motives and strategies and not on the basis of outcomes, similarly to 
Destradi (2010), Pedersen’s pre-categories offer a wider base for analysis than 
Destradi’s. Pedersen’s (2002) pre-conditions for co-operative hegemony include the 
power aggregation capacity, power-sharing capacity and commitment capacity. 
                                                          
21 Online Etymology Dictionary (2015). Hegemony. 
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The power aggregation capacity includes the external pressures (external constellation 
of actors) and the extent to which the potential hegemon is capable of rallying 
neighbouring states around its political project. Power aggregation can come to be 
viewed as ‘illegitimate’22 in the case of regional unipolarity, when a hegemon is too 
powerful, creating the need for subordinate states to discard the hegemon’s claims and 
counterbalance. The external constellation that Prys (2010) also alludes to with her 
regional openness, but does not elaborate on, may shift the power balance in a region, 
especially when there is an external power, creating military overlay, seen as 
threatening by the states in the region23. In this case, the smaller states may come to 
ignore the regional asymmetry and see the regional hegemon appeal to consolidate or 
retrench powers (Pedersen, 2002). In sum, power aggregation capacity refers to the 
potential hegemon’s capacity in (successfully) engaging with the members of the region 
and powers external to the region.  
The power sharing capacity includes the domestic structural factors that Pedersen refers 
to as the strategic culture and regime(s) embedded in history and the polity structure of 
the state. Commenting on the latter, he notes democracies to have a greater power 
sharing capacity, while maintaining that “a weak democratic political culture /…/ may 
affect the way it [hegemony] is perceived by its neighbours”. (Pedersen, 2002) Power-
sharing capacity highlights the domestic level as a possible source of incompatibility or 
weakness in projecting its hegemony in the region.  
The commitment capacity depends on four factors (Pedersen, 2002):  
“1. The costs of non-commitment; 
2. Constitutional rules and procedures facilitating participation in regional integration; 
3. The great power’s economic interest and 
4. The existence of supportive discourse.” 
Pedersen (2002) implies ‘the non-commitment costs for geographically exposed 
regional powers to be high.’ In sum, commitment capacity sees the regional hegemony 
weigh the options of staying committed to the region or in the strategy of a 
                                                          
22 Prys (2010) would argue that a negation of something reinforces its existence, thus not legitimating a 
powerful hegemon, reinforces its position as one. 
23 Threats and power are mostly seen as economic and reactions to the pursuit of relative gains (Nye, 
1990). 
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middle/emerging (regional) power engage the global arena. This decision is mostly 
based on security and economic considerations and also depends on the (potentially 
politically constructed) supportive discourse.  
I will now reformulate Pedersen’s three capacities. Firstly, I will form the ideational 
capacity to include constitutional rules and procedures facilitating participation in 
regional integration, the existence of supportive discourse24 and the state’s strategic 
culture and regimes, including the great power’s [economic] interests. 
Pedersen (2002) separates the state’s idea of the nation from its strategic culture. 
However, both the power-sharing and commitment capacities refer to the compatibility 
of a hegemon’s domestic values and norms to the region’s strategic culture and 
regime(s). For reasons of clarity, I have thus combined these under the ideational 
capacity. 
Secondly, drawing from the regional power literature, drawing from the literature on 
regional powers, there seem to be more constraints on power-sharing than the type of 
polity a regional hegemon is. Following Hurrell (2006), I expand the power-sharing 
capacity to include domestic cohesion as one of the possible stumbling blocks of 
regional hegemony-building, re-naming it as domestic capacity. 
Thirdly, drawing from both the literature on regional powers and institutionalism, I will 
include next to engagement with regional and external powers the engagement in 
regional and global institutions under what I will call the international capacity. I will 
also add the costs of non-commitment here, as the latter can affect the legitimacy of the 
regional hegemon and reduce its international capacity. 
I will now see whether these three capacities suffice in order to adequately analyse 
regional hegemony in the case of Indonesia. The main questions is to look at strengths 
and weaknesses in ideational, domestic and international capacity across the three levels 
of analysis that a regional hegemon is subject to. 
 
                                                          
24 This is also taken to include Prys’ (2010) discourse on a hegemon’s exceptionalism. 
24 
 
2. Methodology 
2.1 Within-case analysis 
The methodology used in this thesis follows the logic of a within-case study. Ragin 
(1992:225) indicates that single-case studies should not be considered as inferior to 
multiple case studies, as single-case studies in their build-up “are multiple in most 
research efforts because ideas and evidence may be linked in many different ways.“ 
Campbell (1975:81-2) adds that „even in a single qualitative study, the conscientious 
social scientist often finds no explanation that seems satisfactory. Such an outcome 
would be impossible if the caricature of the single case study ... were correct—there 
would instead be a surfeit of subjectively compelling explanations.“ ’Within-case 
analysis allows for a thorough immersion in a single case and supports, refutes or 
expands on the propositions derived from the phenomenon in question (Paterson 2010).’  
 
The thesis employs a constructivist, not a positivist philosophy, as the author looks at 
activities and ideas rather than causally linked variables. The result may not be 
parsimonious, however, the empiric details gathered of the phenomenon can be used for 
later theory testing. “The case story is itself the result. It is a ’virtual reality’, so to 
speak. For the reader willing to enter this reality and explore it inside and out the 
payback is meant to be a sensititvity to the issues at hand that cannot be obtained from 
theory [alone].“ (Flyvbjerg, 2006) The case of Indonesia will, thus, allow for reflection 
on the phenomenon of regional hegemony. In this sense, the thesis employs a deductive 
method of analysis, firstly, theorising, then analysing the qualitative data gathered and 
finally, seeing what Indonesia can tell us about regional hegemony and how it has been 
theorised. 
 
Following Flyvbjerg’s (2006) 5 most common ’myths’ of case study methodology, the 
author 
agrees that ’cases are of value since human learning is context-dependent rather than 
context-independent at the level of advanced learning. Generalisations are but one form 
of scientific advancement and thus should not be overemphasised. Case studies are 
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thought to be more useful for the pilot stages of larger research projects, however, case 
studies can provide pragmatic knowledge that can aid theory building.’ 
 
2.2 Case selection 
 
Flyvbjerg (2006), when discussing strategy in choice of cases, admits that “a case can 
be simultaneously extreme, critical, and paradigmatic.“ Indonesia has been considered 
representative of regional hegemony25, it possesses the geostrategic and geopolitical 
capacity to become a regional hegemon. However, when looking at the make-up of the 
regional setting, one can see that Indonesia does not necessarily stand out more than 
other founders of ASEAN, such as Singapore and Malaysia.26 These juxtaposing views 
make Indonesia both a ’most likely’ and ’least likely’ case for regional hegemony.  
 
Indonesia is also a paradigmatic case. Dreyfus in Flyvbjerg (2006) explains it as 
follows: “Heiddeger says, you recognise a paradigm case because it shines, but I’m 
afraid that is not much help. You just have to be intuitive. We all can tell what is a 
better or worse case—of a Cezanne painting, for instance. But I can’t think there could 
be any rules for deciding what makes Cezanne a paradigmatic modern painter... [I]t is a 
big problem in democratic society where people are supposed to justify what their 
intuitions are. In fact, nobody really can justify what their intuition is. So you have to 
make up reasons, but it won’t be the real reasons.“ These “intuitive decisions are 
accountable, in the sense of being sensible to other practitioners or often explicable if 
not immediately sensible.“ (Flyvbjerg, 2006) Indonesia has been referred to Indonesia’s 
relative economic weight as well as its historical role of a hegemon, its geostrategic 
position of a pivot state and an interest to sustain regional peace and stability27 exhibit a 
capacity for regional hegemony. Moreover, international –both regional and global—
developments suggest potential for hegemony. 
 
                                                          
25 see Emmers (2005, 2014) 
26 This remark is based on the literature written on these countries the author came across when 
investigating Southeast Asia’s potential regional hegemonies. 
27 Stability here is referred to separately from peace since stability refers to whatever status quo is 
accepted in the region. 
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2.3 Data gathering and implications 
 
’Case studies do not imply the use of any particular type of evidence, yet more often 
qualitative than quantitative data is used.’ (Yin, 1981) The author has also opted to 
carry out qualitative research. The empirics are based on both primary and secondary 
sources. In overcoming the “bias toward verification, understood as a tendency to 
confirm the researcher’s preconceived notions, so that the study therefore becomes of 
doubtful scientific value“ that Flyvbjerg (2006) alludes to, the author has applied two 
thought paradigms throughout the research: falsifying and verifying the existence of 
hegemonic capacity in Indonesia.  
The author has sourced the material through a ‘security lens’, meaning that the 
information presented will mostly deal with issues of national security, conflict 
management and agenda-setting with regard to security within ASEAN28 and 
engagement with global powers. However, the author of this thesis will not discard the 
economic and social considerations, in strong conjunction with those of security29.  
The author is aware of the strong linkage between Indonesia’s social scientists and the 
ruling elite, as summarised by Hadiwinata (2009). The author has also sought out works 
by scholars from other (Southeast) Asian nations to eliminate bias resulting from 
potential political rhetoric relating to Indonesia’s capabilities internationally. 
Furthermore, the author has made note of secondary sources where ASEAN’s 
hegemonic capacity was linguistically equated with that of Indonesia. Furthermore, a 
working knowledge of the Indonesian language would have proven useful to eliminate 
the possible bias arising from potential errors in translation.  
 
                                                          
28 The author does not argue here whether ASEAN is a security complex or community. Notably, in the 
late great Michael Leifer’s opinion ASEAN was a diplomatic community rather than an organisation 
bound by specific norms, „for diplomacy is a tool that serves the interests of states rather than 
subordinates those interests to any wider purpose or conception of order“ in Cotton, J. The domestic 
sources of regional order in Michael Leifer’s analysis of Southeast Asia in Order and Security in 
Southeast Asia, Essays in memory of Michael Leifer (Emmers & Liow, 2006). For a comprehensive 
analysis of ASEAN as a potential security community, see Acharya (2014), cf ch 5. 
29 This approach is also complimentary to the comprehensive logic of the ASEAN Security Community 
Action Plan which commits ASEAN member states to address the political, economic and social aspects 
of community-building (Secretariat, 2014a).   
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2.4 Levels of analysis 
I have chosen to study the phenomenon of regional hegemony on the following three 
levels of analysis: domestic, regional and global.  The choice of levels of analysis is 
supported by the theory section, indicating possible domestic and global constraints to 
regional hegemony-building. The need to look at the domestic level stems from the 
weaknesses of regional powers’ domestic capacities. The need to understand the 
regional-global nexus can be matched with Tucker’s (1995:15-8) reflections embedded 
in psychology that leadership is most needed in situations of crisis, more specifically 
when the group is threatened from the outside and in the everyday business of IR, 
indicating that a regional hegemon has to deal with external actors. The regional level is 
introduced separately from the international system, as according to Buzan and Waever 
(2003) it acts as a separate ontological and analytical entity. Furthermore, including the 
regional level will create a conceptual space for the inclusion of regional institutions.  
Furthermore, by choosing three broad levels of analysis, I bypass the theoretical 
implications of the agency-structure problem, as elaborated by Wendt (1987).  
2.5 Analytical framework 
The main research question is stated as follows: 
What are the strengths and weaknesses associated with Indonesian hegemony-building 
across the three levels of analysis? 
The strengths and weaknesses can be ascertained by looking at whether they support or 
undermine hegemony-building in the three capacities derived from theory.  
In sum, the following three capacities are: 
1. ideational capacity (existence of supportive discourse, norm/rule, value and 
interest compatibility with the region or the external constellation) 
2. domestic capacity (domestic polity and domestic cohesion) 
3. international capacity (engagement with regional and global actors and 
institutions, responsibility, commitment) 
In order to assess the strengths and weaknesses of hegemony-building, firstly, 
Indonesia’s historic-geopolitical identity is examined to indicate the existence of 
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supportive discourse to hegemonic ambitions. Secondly under examination are the 
possible implications of domestic insecurity. Thirdly, the strategic culture also featured 
in the set of constitutional rules and procedures and economic interests is examined. 
Lastly, for the engagement in various regional and international political projects and 
with superpowers, the establishment of institutions and agenda-setting, mediation of 
conflicts and inter-state relations are examined as suggested by Ougaard (1988). 
The results will be reported in two sets of tables, indicating the main weaknesses and 
strengths to the three capacities regarding hegemony-building. 
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3. Empirics 
Southeast Asia, a post-colonial space in the 1950s, was faced with many regional 
conflicts. Indonesia, led by Sukarno, was engaged in the foreign policy of 
Konfrontasi30. Trying to stabilise the region and not have it torn apart by polarising 
alignments that arose from the Cold War setting, in 1976 the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established. ASEAN did not come to be overnight, the 
failure of Association of South Asia (ASA) and the Greater Malayan Confederation 
(Maphilindo), led to the understanding that Indonesia must exercise constraint to be 
included and function well in a regional formation. 
After the fall of Sukarno, Suharto set out to emphasise its commitments to the principles 
of non-interference and non-alignment and the non-use of force. According to Leifer 
(1983:120-1), “regional cooperation with Indonesia’s enthusiastic participation was 
envisaged both as means to satisfy its natural ambition and also to contain its more 
objectionable hegemonic disposition.” Dijwandono cited in Emmers (2005) noted in 
1989 that Indonesia’s membership in ASEAN might be enough to accord it with the 
status of first among equals31 without resort to confrontational foreign policy and 
coercion. Suharto’s policy had to alleviate the mistrust against Indonesia, not only 
towards the latter’s policies by showing no ill intent towards its neighbours, but also 
towards the latter’s functioning as a stable state by becoming socio-economically 
stronger and socially cohesive.  
In a statement to the Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and 
Development of the House International Relations Committee, Pauker (1976) describes 
Indonesian hegemonic capacity as rather weak. He accepts the strategic downplaying of 
Sukarno’s grand plans and Konfrontasi foreign policy by Suharto, indicating 
nevertheless that even if Indonesia had a stronger desire for a hegemonic position in the 
region, its policy of self-restraint has left the country militarily incapable of exerting 
influence over its economically more advanced neighbours. The former account tends to 
                                                          
30 Confrontation (1963-66) between Indonesia and Malaysia, a practice of coercive diplomacy designed to 
provoke diplomatic in Indonesia’s interest to stop the formation of a British-backed Federation of 
Malaysia (Leifer, 2013).  
31 in Latin primus inter pares, both the English and Latin version are used interchangeably in this thesis. 
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favour the realist thought on material capabilities presupposing the rise of a hegemon, 
however, hegemony is more than materiality, as indicated in the theory section of this 
thesis. 
Indonesia has frustrated academics for a long time. Indonesia, a geopolitically and 
geostrategically well-equipped state32, has been known to punch below its weight. 
Indonesia has not collapsed, despite many academics referring to the possible 
disintegration of Indonesia after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the subsequent fall of 
Suharto’s regime and the difficulties faced during the democratic transformation of the 
country.33 Yet, Indonesia has not reached its full potential either.  
Although at first glance, it would seem that Indonesia has been a regional dominator 
and after the 1998 Asian financial crisis, detached from the region due to domestic 
instability, economic downfall and engagement in transition from authoritarianism to 
democracy, I will trace the case for Indonesia’s potential regional hegemony in the 
Southeast Asia region. The idea here is not to assert that Indonesia is or will become a 
hegemon, but trace the embryonics of hegemony-building. The material gathered and 
analysed in the next chapters looks at strengths and weaknesses of Indonesia’s 
hegemony-building at the domestic, regional and global levels. In order to analyse 
Indonesia’s potential regional hegemony, this case study starts off with the introduction 
of underlying notions of Indonesia’s foreign policy and shows the historic contingency 
of these beliefs throughout the independent Indonesia era. 
3.1 Underlying notions of Indonesia’s foreign policy 
Reasons why Indonesia has never thrown around its weight on the world stage can be 
found in the foundations of the constitution and the principles of Pancasila34, resulting 
in a diplomatic technique that Michael Leifer (1983:88), a long time expert and writer 
on Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries, notes to encompass diplomasi 
(negotiation), perjuangan (struggle35) and mushawarah (close consultations). He 
follows that this technique has been to a large part upheld since Indonesia gained 
                                                          
32 By this the author means, among other things, Indonesia’s location in the heart of Southeast Asia, its 
historical leadership in the region and after 9/11 more purposefully projecting itself as a bridge between 
the Middle East and the West. 
33 Most notably in A. Smith (1999). 
34 In English literally the Five Principles. 
35 Resulting, first and foremost, from Indonesia’s struggle with the Dutch for independence. 
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independence in 1949. The resulting foreign policy based on Pancasila and the 1945 
Constitution can be described in the words of Adam Malik, Indonesia’s third vice 
president, quoted in Leifer (1983:115) as “independent and active, opposed to 
imperialism and colonialism in all their forms and manifestations, and participating in 
implementing a world role based on independence, abiding peace and social justice.“ 
What came to be known as the politik bebas aktif holds the free (independent) and 
active component. The first relates to Indonesia not being dictated by great powers, the 
latter to actively shaping international relations as not to be subject to external pressure 
(Murphy, 2009). 
Indonesia’s nationalist rhetoric is definitely one of paradox. This can be, firstly, 
summed up by what Leifer (1983:173) describes as Indonesia being a country led by its 
vulnerability: 
“The experience of upholding independence in both domestic and international 
dimensions generated an abiding concern for the integrity of a state beset by social 
diversity and physical fragmentation. That concern was reinforced by a conviction about 
the country’s attractiveness to external interests because of its bountiful natural 
resources and important strategic location. A common and consistent theme of 
Indonesia’s foreign policy has been the need to overcome an intrinsic vulnerability.” 
This vulnerability can be seen as stemming from the very same capacities that make it a 
state to consider36 – from its archipelagic state and having the 4th largest population in 
the world, making it difficult to effectively organise and provide for its nation.  
Indonesia has been historically regarded as the rightful leader of Southeast Asia.37 
Mohammed Hatta (1953), Indonesia’s first vice president, exemplifies Indonesia’s 
(continued) understanding of its position and role in foreign affairs:  
“Nature has ordained that Indonesia, lying between two continents–the Asian mainland 
and Australia–and washed by the waters of two vast oceans–the Indian and the Pacific–
must maintain intercourse with lands stretching in a great circle around it. From time 
immemorial, it has had relationships with all of them, varied as they are. Its position at 
                                                          
36 A paradox of entitlement and insecurity based on the same key factors that Leifer (1983) also refers to. 
37 See Emmers (2005, 2014), the former features an overview of Indonesia in Southeast Asia, the latter 
provides it with the theoretical base that was lacking in the former. 
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the very heart of a network of communications has for centuries made the archipelago a 
halting place for all races and a staging base in international travel. When one considers 
that the territory of Indonesia extends for more than 3,000 miles and is composed of 
thousands of islands, large and small, the magnitude of the problem of maintaining the 
security of the country is apparent. So extensive an area cannot be defended purely by 
military strength.”  
Hatta’s paragraph illustrates the continued need for the upkeep of a unitary stable 
country and its security not only through material capabilities and reliance on 
Indonesia’s position, but also through engagement with neighbouring countries. Hatta 
has in his writing recognised that a Realpolitik view of the world is not sustainable, a 
lesson learnt from the colonisation and struggles for independence.  
This view in Indonesia’s foreign policy can best be summed up in ‘concentric [self-
interest] circles’, stemming from the grand strategy devised by General Benny 
Murdani38: 
1. The first concentric circle begins with the nation itself – the independence, 
national unity, security and interest; 
2. The second circle extends to include ASEAN; 
3. The third circle covers the area of Southeast Asia; 
4. The fourth circle spreads to cover the whole of Asia; 
5. The fifth circle reaches the other developing and Islamic countries; 
6. The sixth and final circle deals with global matters. 
Murdani explains that “Our [Indonesia’s] pragmatic approach is such that we always 
look to safeguard the one before reaching out to the next.”39 Nation-building is still 
ongoing in Indonesia, thus domestic problems seep into its foreign policy. Concentric 
self-interest places the state and its inner workings at the forefront of foreign policy 
agenda, while still encouraging relations with neighbouring and other countries in 
ensuring the state’s security.   
                                                          
38 Quoted by Sebastian via Hein (1986) in Emmers and Liow (2006), p. 180 
39 ibid. 
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Indonesia has exemplified this concentric thinking time and time again. The 1997 Asian 
financial crisis and subsequent fall of Suharto and introduction of Reformasi40 saw 
Indonesia enter into a long period of recession and difficult transformation and 
withdraw from its previously more active role in foreign politics. Michael Leifer’s 
(1999a) account of early diplomatic paralysis from 1997-1999 substantiates this claim. 
A 2007 Department of Defence presentation on internal and external challenges 
showcases yet a similar concentric logic. As survival interests, territorial integrity and 
national sovereignty have been marked down; of vital interest are the promotion of good 
governance, democracy, human rights and economic recovery. Interestingly enough, 
engagement beyond ASEAN has been noted as marginal (Susanto, 2007).  
In sum, Indonesia’s foreign policy is greatly influenced by its intrinsic weaknesses as an 
archipelagic state. Due to Indonesia’s colonial background and the struggle for 
independence the country has learned to carry out its foreign policy through a 
diplomatic technique valuing close consultations and negotiation instead of destructive 
methods that might invoke threats to Indonesia’s statehood or regional stability. 
Indonesia’s self-image of primus inter pares further showcases Indonesia’s commitment 
to being a leader of the Southeast Asian region. However, Indonesia’s foreign policy 
has been noted to work in concentric circles, meaning that unless the domestic level of 
security is maintained, focus will not be extended to the regional and global circles, 
indicating a possible decrease in hegemonic commitment depending on the domestic 
situation. 
3.2 Domestic 
The following domestic assessment focuses on Indonesia trying to maintain and 
increase its territorial and social cohesion. These are related to maritime vulnerabilities 
and issues stemming from and still accompanying the transition to democracy, for 
example, separatism and low socio-political cohesion.  
Questioning Indonesia’s domestic stability is not a new occurrence. Many ASEAN 
member states have alluded to Indonesia’s domestic stability being of importance to the 
continued strengthening of regional commitments. Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh 
Ghok Tong, speaking at the time of Indonesia’s difficult democratic transition, sums up 
                                                          
40 Democratic transition. 
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the continued fear of Indonesia’s disintegration, indicating that “the consequence for the 
entire region will be horrendous” (Weatherbee, 2005). As an archipelagic state, 
Indonesia fears dismemberment. The result of this fear is translated into emphasis on 
“unity, rapid economic development, economic nationalism, political stability and the 
absolute sanctity of national borders,” Sebastian (2006). This led Indonesia to push for 
the ‘archipelago principle’ in the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea 
(UNCLOS) in 1982, marked as “the greatest achievement of Indonesia’s norm-building 
efforts” by Anwar (2013). Indonesia, an archipelago of 13 000 islands, now enjoys wide 
jurisdiction based on UNCLOS, however, maintaining national unity and integrity on 
top of issues with illegal fishing, smuggling and other violations have shown the 
weakness of the Indonesian state in addressing these issues (Djalal, 2012).  
The land and sea of Indonesia are of strategic importance to regional and global 
actors41, on the domestic level, maintaining the archipelago has brought along many 
issues for Indonesia. Djalal (2012) notes that the coastline and maritime zones offer 
relatively easy access to smugglers, drug dealers, pirates and terrorists. Maritime 
security is a problem not only for Indonesia, but for many countries in Southeast Asia, 
be it in issues such as overlapping claims on islands42, or illegal activities, such as 
smuggling, drug and human trafficking or legal delimitation issues.43 The small 
economic and financial capacity, especially a defense budget of only 1 percent44, make 
it difficult for Indonesia to maintain law and order to secure maritime resources and 
ensure that shipping interests through Indonesia’s maritime zones are met (Sebastian, 
2006). Handling these problems has seen Indonesia turn to non-benign methods, 
including blowing up illegal fishing ships (Quartz, 2015).  
Indonesia’s at times distinctly nationalist and inward-looking decisions have further 
counteracted its benign and committed leadership (Vatikiotis, 2012). Roberts’ (2012) 
account of the 1997 haze problem serves as an example. Smoke rising from the fires 
that swept Kalimantan and Sumatra created a wall of smoke that expanded from 
                                                          
41 Dibb (2001) has expressed a similar stance from the point of view of Australia, naming Indonesia the 
key to Southeast Asia’s security. It seems that Indonesia is not only big enough, but also situated as such 
to interest many. 
42 Most notably, the Spratly islands. 
43 For an overview see Bateman et al. (2012).  
44 In 2015, it is only 0.8 percent of GDP (Domínguez, 2015). 
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Indonesia to the rest of maritime Southeast Asia, Singapore and Australia. Regular 
incidents of transboundary pollution have continued to plague the region since and 
Indonesia has been called out for these human-induced fires by Singapore and Malaysia. 
Collaborative efforts have already been put in place to stop haze problems and curb 
palm oil misuse (Ardiansyah, 2010). However, a recent report showing the connection 
between palm oil plantation crimes and illegal logging, indicates that the problem is yet 
to be curbed due to poor policing capacity of the Indonesian government (Johnson and 
Wadley, 2014). 
Recently, with the likes of Richard Branson asking President Jokowi to revoke the death 
penalty on drug smugglers, Indonesia’s benign leadership has once again been put on 
the (‘global’) spot (Taylor, 2015). Advocating itself as a supporter of human rights and 
not responding to pleas from abroad has dented Indonesia’s image, with Australia and 
Brazil pulling its ambassadors from Indonesia and France expected to do the same 
(BBC, 2015). The island state lacks capacity to deal with smugglers, thus sending a 
clear message to future criminals – get caught, be killed – seems to be the thought 
process behind the latest executions, popularised in media as the Bali Nine killings.45 
Furthermore, accosting release for Aceh and Papua prisoners46 and responding to the 
Philippine’s plea to release an alleged drug trafficker47, one of the Bali Nine, yet failing 
to do so for two Australians executed earlier this April, seems to re-emphasise 
Indonesia’s following of a concentric logic that business at home comes first. 
These examples of domestic insecurity are a select few, yet they illustrate Indonesia 
turning to non-benevolent and strict measures when its territorial integrity and 
sovereignty are threatened. Further emphasising the ‘concentric logic’, it also indicates 
that Indonesia is more likely to refrain from cooperative measures in light of its own 
problems despite them having (adverse) effects on others in the region. With 
Indonesia’s ‘loud actions’ concerning illegal fishing and human trafficking, many 
Southeast Asian states have questioned Indonesia’s commitment to the usually ‘silent 
diplomacy’ of the region (Siswo, 2015). Former suspicions of Indonesia’s 
aggressiveness seem to be buried, yet concerns about Indonesia’s self-centred approach 
                                                          
45 This line of thought stems from a discussion with my supervisor, Eoin McNamara on 30 April 2015. 
46 See Cochrane (2015). 
47 See Phipps (2015). 
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have others in the region worried about whether it can effectively take on the role of a 
regional hegemon.  
3.2.1 Democracy 
It seems that Indonesia is still considered fragile, as with every new election, concerns 
about the stability of the state, the possible riots breaking out, radicals rallying against 
the new government in power emerge.48 However, Sukma (2009b) offers hope in that 
Indonesia has successfully managed to internalise the means for peaceful dispute 
settlement and the function of elections as a legitimate means of political succession. 
The former is especially important in the light of the many ethnic challenges that 
Indonesia faces, and has previously responded to with violence. The violent response to 
East Timor’s independence, the 2005 insurgency in Aceh and the on-going conflict in 
Irian Jaya/West Papua are the latest examples. The latter two are still a source of strife 
for Indonesia, continuing to weigh down the central government.  
Aspinall and Berger (2001) admit that losing Papua could be brushed off as a historical 
exception since Papua, similarly to East Timor, did not play a major role in the history 
of Indonesian nation-building; the resistance of the Acehnese to the Dutch colonial 
forces, however, has been incorporated in the Indonesian nationalist sentiment. Aceh, 
similarly to Papua, Riau and East Kalimantan, has been exploited for primary 
commodities, however, in Aceh this exploitation resonates strongly with the already 
existing discourse of deprivation, making the Acehnese see themselves as victims of the 
Indonesian state (Aspinall, 2007). Djalal (2012) further acknowledges that “most of the 
people in Indonesia live in the island of Java. This has created tension between Western 
Indonesia and its eastern regions, leading the latter to protest against being 
economically exploited in favour of the development in Java.“ Low socio-political 
cohesion and a possible breakaway manifest themselves as definite weaknesses to 
Indonesia’s statehood and its commitment to the role of a regional hegemon. 
However, there are silver linings offered by the democratic transition. In his article, 
Ghoshal (2004), analysing the prospects and challenges of Indonesia’s democracy and 
constitutional liberalism, concludes that at the grassroots level many civil society 
groups have been established, the fight against corruption, violence and the advocacy of 
                                                          
48 Sukma (2009b) alludes to this in the fear of history repeating itself during the 2009 elections.  
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human rights is in progress. The continuation of the (grass-root) democratic process and 
progress and economic recovery will not only strengthen democracy in Indonesia, but 
also aid in raising the levels of social and territorial cohesion, as more and more people 
will enjoy economic prosperity and see their rights being upheld by the central 
government49. The notion of regional development helping to reduce regional 
disparities as well as political conflicts, especially in the eastern parts of Indonesia, are 
also featured in the Jakarta Commitment to fighting poverty (Salim, 2011).  
On the other hand, these silver linings should be taken with a pinch of salt, as 
governments cannot guarantee economic growth, despite Indonesia having enjoyed an 
average 6 percent growth in GDP over the last few years (The World Bank, 2015). 
Political reformation from an authoritarian government to democracy needs work in the 
area of human capacity building. Moreover, Indonesia has showcased entrenched 
economic nationalism50 which could very well counter their economic growth which 
has already seen a drop to 4.7 percent in the first quarter (The Economist, 2015). 
Stemming from historic distrust, foreign ownership is disliked. Yet, foreign direct 
investment is essential for building up Indonesia’s infrastructure and democratic 
mechanisms. 
Indonesia’s ambitions, stemming from its national pride and ideology of being primus 
inter pares, have been indeed hampered by domestic constrictions, such as the worry 
over possible separatism in eastern parts of Indonesia. Indonesia has had a history of 
violence when responding to intra-state tensions. The transition to democracy 
highlighted this violence, as Aceh and Papua freedom fighters called for independence. 
As a newly democratic country, Indonesia is still facing troubles with socio-economic 
and socio-political cohesion. Despite enjoying economic growth, the state system needs 
further reformation in ensuring that corruption is eradicated and people regain their trust 
in the central government, making it easier for Indonesia to organise the country. 
Economic nationalism has called for alarm, as Indonesia’s economic growth has already 
experienced a drop compared to the last quarter. Indonesia’s constraint and continuous 
                                                          
49 The logic here alludes to the positive correlations between violent conflict and poverty, inequality, and 
variables measuring economic development in Indonesia’s local conflicts (Barron, Kaiser, & Pradhan, 
2009). 
50 This could also affect regional plans at the ASEAN Economic Community level. For more examples on 
Indonesia’s economic nationalism, see Vatikiotis (2012), Kurniawati (2014). 
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domestic improvement have, however, given further rise to Indonesia’s exceptionalism 
and instilled a new-found belief that Indonesia can once again become a driving force in 
regional and global institutions.  
3.2.2 Muslim politics and radicalism 
Indonesia is the most populous Muslim country51 in the world. This has offered both 
opportunities for political rhetoric as well as cautioned the ruling elite to tread carefully 
in keeping the nationalist Muslim movements at bay.  
The authoritarian regime saw the downplaying of Muslim politics. During the Bush era, 
with the announcement of a ‘war against terror’, Indonesia saw the opportunity in 
avoiding being cast on the ‘axis of Evil’ and emphasised its role as a mediator of Islam 
and the West. With the rise of terrorism in the face of ISIS (the Islam State of Iraq and 
Syria aka ILIL, the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant), the once held fears of Indonesia 
becoming a hotbed for terrorists and terrorism have resurfaced. Although General TNI 
Moeldoko has firmly restated that the military control will leave no room for ISIS 
recruiters in Indonesia (Antara, 2015), other analysts were quick to counter those claims 
by indicating to the rate at which Indonesians are being recruited (Wall Street Journal, 
2015). Moreover, the concern lies in returning ISIS combatants whose influence was felt 
in the bombing of a shopping mall in Indonesia using chlorine (Safi, 2015).  
Moreover, violent and non-violent extremists groups still exist in Indonesia. Two most 
notorious Islamist militia groups, FPI and Laskar Jihad, have not been tried for breaking 
the law (Smith, 2003), nor has Indonesia banned any political organisations, including 
Jemaah Islamiyah since 1998 (Ward, 2009). Ward (2009) offers tentative answers to 
whether a secular national ideology or the rival concept of an Islamic state will prevail 
in the future. However, there is nothing that suggests a move towards radical Islam in 
spheres of state governance. Murphy (2009) indicates that in 2004 when Islamic parties 
failed to make Islam the state religion, this discussion was put to rest. Taking Hizbut 
Tahrir (HTI), a non-violent extremist group in Indonesia as an example, Ward (2009) 
maintains that even though the Indonesian government has its hands tied with not 
curbing (non-violent) extremist activities due to a feared Muslim backlash of ‘silencing’ 
                                                          
51 Indonesia refers to herself as a Muslim country, not a Muslim state governed by Islam. 
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the people, HTI’s goals will not be seeing an increase in support until democracy and 
values associated with it have been deemed incompatible with Indonesia by the people 
voting.  
Indonesia having the world’s largest Muslim population has in the wake of terrorism 
been seen as a potential threat to regional stability. The question has been raised 
whether there is room for Indonesia’s principle of ‘democracy’ that some local groups 
would like to see eradicated and some domestic groups in Indonesia would like to see 
reflected in Indonesia’s foreign policy, especially in ASEAN where many members still 
facilitate oppressive regimes. In general, it can be said that Indonesia has been 
successful in combining moderate Islam with democracy, increasing, in theory, its 
capacity for democracy projection to other Muslim countries.  
3.3 Regional 
Indonesia’s role in the region has been understated compared to the Suharto era, where 
Indonesia’s restraint on its previous confrontational foreign policy and a constraint on 
the country due to authoritarian rule was deemed as complimentary to Indonesia being 
primus inter pares and accepted by others as such. Anwar (1994) writes: “Voluntary 
restraint in Indonesia’s role in ASEAN was desired to allay any lingering suspicions 
towards Indonesia. Nevertheless, there was an expectation from the Indonesian 
leadership that the other members of the association should give due recognition to 
Indonesia’s low-profile role, and not take such self-restraint for granted. Moreover, 
Indonesia’s low posture was not meant to give an opportunity to other members to lead 
ASEAN.” Anwar further emphasises that “one of the most important roles of ASEAN 
for Indonesia as perceived by the political elite had been in helping to project the 
country’s image as a moderate, peace-loving, and development-minded state, especially 
in relation to major world economic powers.” 
What Anwar wrote back in 1994, still applies to Indonesia in ASEAN today. The 
association helps maintain Indonesia’s international credibility and status; preserve 
regional harmony as well as act as a buffer for national security; aids in maintaining a 
non-aligned regional order. Lastly, the association provides a platform for international 
bargaining. Anwar states Indonesia’s primary interest to be in areas of politics and 
security, remarking an indirect interest in economics. This stems from Indonesia’s 
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economic nationalism and the fact that foreign direct investment for Indonesia’s 
development could only come from the great powers outside ASEAN. (Anwar, 1994)  
By 2004, things had stabilised in Indonesia after the ouster of Suharto left the country in 
tatters, the immediate priority lay in restoring the international image to mend 
Indonesia’s broken confidence52 and appeal to foreign investors to ensure continuing 
development (Sukma, 2012). The shock of Indonesia losing its status as economy 
worsened reinvigorated Indonesia’s belief in remaining economically strong (Murphy, 
2009). The last decade has thus seen the re-emergence of Indonesia as a regional (and 
global) player. What Emmerson (2012) thinks ASEAN needs is “being led quietly and 
ably ‘from behind’ by a member state with a sense of responsibility, the asset of 
credibility, and a preference for persuasion over confrontation,“ hinting at Indonesia 
fitting the role.  
3.3.1 ASEAN principles, shared norms 
With the signing of the I Bali Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) 
in 1976, Indonesia signalled to its neighbours its commitments to adhere to the shared 
norms of Southeast Asian nations. What has come to be known as the ‘ASEAN Way53’ 
can be traced in the second chapter of TAC (Secretariat, 2014b): 
“a. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and 
national identity of all nations; 
b. The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, 
subversion or coercion; 
c. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; 
d. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means; 
e. Renunciation of the threat or use of force; 
f. Effective cooperation among themselves.” 
                                                          
52 Indonesia is arguably the most prideful country in Southeast Asia. 
53 See Katsumata (2003) for an overview of the development of the ’ASEAN Way’. 
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In a nutshell, the ‘ASEAN Way’ refers to the non-use of force and non-interference, 
aimed to protect sovereignty and emphasise commitment to constraint. ‘National 
resilience’ and ‘regional resilience’, found in the eleventh chapter of TAC (ASEAN 
Secretariat, 2014b), once again advocated by Indonesia, aid in the protection of 
sovereignty; a country’s efforts to maintain its territory and cohesion would be seen as 
translating into a more secure regional setting, too. The 1970 Declaration of the Zone of 
Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) introduced by Indonesia reinforced the ‘holy 
trinity’ of non-use of force, non-intervention and non-alignment, reconfirming that 
internally strong states would produce a strong region (Secretariat, 2000). To 
accommodate Indonesia’s initiatives taken towards Vietnam and the Soviet Union at the 
time of the Vietnamese incursion into Thai territory, ASEAN also agreed to the 
accommodation of member states’ freedom to pursue their own foreign policy 
(Snitwongse, 1998).  
Freedom of foreign policy choice can be complemented by the evolving concept of non-
alignment. Indonesia’s non-alignment principle shared with ASEAN has been stretched 
in concept and practice since the days of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM). It is no 
longer taken to mean neutrality in great power balance of power play. Non-alignment 
now is seen as a foundation to the ‘balance of interest’ approach to powers surrounding 
the Southeast Asian nations (Sebastian, 2006). Sebastian (2006) indicates that “while 
Indonesians voice support for the idea that non-alignment as a principle should 
transcend ideology [stemming from an anti-communist sentiment], they are pragmatic 
in asserting that each country has the right to choose its own form of government and 
follow its own developmental path, in accordance with its particular national priorities, 
cultural background, and historical evolution.” 
The code of conduct associated with the ‘ASEAN Way’ emphasises consensus and 
consultation, an informal means of negotiation, a two-track, silent diplomacy. Although 
ASEAN has been criticised for being ‘of process’ and not ‘of progress’54, lengthy 
dialogue and consultation have offered more leeway in reaching a consensus55, which 
                                                          
54 The first ASEAN Formal Summit was held in 1976, 9 years after the initial inauguration, illustrating 
this “slow and steady“ mentality. 
55 As the disparities between the rich and poor ASEAN countries deepen, more recognition has been 
given to giving way to the formula of ’10 minus X’ in some cases (Snitwongse, 1998). 
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should not be understood as a procedural counting of votes, but rather as referring to a 
common understanding (even of things not understood or accepted by all) (Katsumata, 
2003). Still to this day, the ‘ASEAN Way’ provides a necessary structure to build trust 
and confidence among members in various regional fora, including the ASEAN 
Ministerial Meetings (AMM), ASEAN Plus-Mechanisms, such as ASEAN Plus Three 
(ASEAN together with China, Japan and South Korea), ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF).56 
The strengths and weaknesses of the ideational capacity of Indonesia based on these 
common norms will be discussed in the following chapters. 
3.3.2 Conflict mediation 
Adhering to the ASEAN principles, Indonesia has helped reduce the potential for intra-
regional conflicts through conflict management. Earlier mediations of Indonesia include 
the conflict between Malaysia and Singapore and the Philippine government and 
Mindanao separatists, Indonesia serving on the International Control Commission 
during the Vietnam War and as an ASEAN interlocutor in Cambodia (Anwar, 1994). 
Indonesia has been increasingly active ever since it held the Chairmanship of ASEAN 
in 2011, indicating that a stronger Indonesia could afford looking at regional matters. 
However, it is difficult to assess the contribution Indonesia has had in managing 
regional conflicts in the 2000s, unless ad hoc measures were reported to be taken, as any 
other form of conflict management among ASEAN member states would fall under the 
joint flag of ASEAN. Moreover, the ‘corridor diplomacy’ and ‘ASEAN way’ of doing 
things leaves much hidden from the general public57. 
A case in point would be the allusion to Indonesia’s crucial role in the aftermath of 
Cyclone Nargis. In 2008 when Cyclone Nargis hit and Myanmar was incapable of 
dealing with the consequent humanitarian crisis, calls for a humanitarian intervention 
were raised and ASEAN was pressured to act. Roberts notes his e-mail correspondence 
with an ambassador to Singapore who recalls that at an ASEAN Ministerial meeting 
“Indonesia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs leaned across the table and asked the Foreign 
                                                          
56 An extensive list of different fora for the three ASEAN pillars can be found at the ASEAN website at 
http://www.asean.org/ 
57 This includes researchers. 
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Minister of Myanmar what he thought ASEAN membership meant to Myanmar and 
what – at that time and in those circumstances – Myanmar’s membership meant to 
ASEAN – in terms of ASEAN’s internal coherence – international profile58 – and its 
membership’s shared vision for the future.” Roberts and Widyaningsigh (2014) 
highlight Indonesia’s role in pressuring Myanmar as a persuasive factor in the latter 
allowing foreign aid organisations into the country. 
In 2011, Indonesia offered to mediate the border conflict between Thailand and 
Cambodia, a first in the history of ASEAN member state initiatives (Sukma, 2012). In 
February 2011, when the Cambodia-Thailand border dispute broke, it was arguably 
Indonesia’s “shuttle diplomacy” that helped put a stop to use of military power on both 
sides. Indonesia, although rejected many times by both parties, managed to have a team 
of observers sent over to the area of the disputed temple, Preah Vihear. (Afrida and 
Santosa, 2012) However, it was the ruling of the International Court of Justice that 
finally settled the conflict. 
The biggest hindrance in maintaining these friendly relations have been the disputes 
regarding the South China Sea. In 2012, with Cambodia chairing ASEAN, Indonesia 
took it upon itself to maintain ‘ASEAN centrality’ after the customary communique was 
failed to be produced over diverging views on the South China Sea, a first in the 45 
years of ASEAN. Even though Indonesia enjoyed international acclaim for Marty 
Natalegawa’s 10-day trip undertaken to ensure some sort of closure and easing of 
tensions, which resulted in announcing ASEAN’s Six Point Principles on the South 
China Sea, Indonesia’s shuttle diplomacy was also viewed as bypassing ASEAN 
multilateralism and ‘going at it alone’ without regard to the actual claimants of the 
dispute (Saragih, 2012).  
Even though Indonesia is not a direct claimant, the Natuna Island, Indonesia’s biggest 
island in the South China Sea and natural gas field, has raised concerns about China’s 
intentions, with China publishing a nine-dashed line which shows that connecting 
China’s claimed areas in South China Sea would also cut through the exclusive 
economic zone of Natuna (Lee, 2014). Indonesia has avoided having an open 
                                                          
58 This internal coherence and the principle of non-intervention were threatened by calls from external 
actors to enter Myanmar without the latter’s consent. 
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confrontation with Beijing, seeing that bilateral trade with China amounts to a third of 
Indonesia’s total trade and China is the second market for exports after Japan 
(Dominguez, 2015).59 The Chinese Indonesian community makes up only 3% of the 
population, yet controls 70% of Indonesia’s economy (Adibe, 2015).  
The developments on the South China Sea can challenge Indonesia’s role of a mediator, 
an ‘honest broker’ it has set out to be. Jakarta’s neutrality on the issue has been called to 
question (Suryadinata, 2015). Recalling Indonesia’s failures in dealing with regional 
issues that infringe directly on its territorial integrity and sovereignty, these fears are 
understandable. Sebastian (2006) lists the ‘West Irian campaign, Konfrontasi, and the 
invasion of East Timor in 1975 to highlight Indonesia’s military actions in areas of 
external security where diplomatic negotiations failed, that became a direct threat to 
national security.’  
Commitment to ASEAN and the principles of consultation and consensus will still be 
upheld within and outside of multilateral frameworks60. The 26th ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting is in correlation with this logic. Despite Indonesia enjoying being courted by 
the United States and China, Marsrudi, Foreign Minister of Indonesia, indicated the 
country’s commitment to the multilateral resolution of the South China Sea dispute(s) 
(Otto, 2015). Moreover, in a recent interview with General Moeldoko of Indonesia, 
responding to fears of Indonesia confronting China, Moeldoko expressed Indonesia’s 
continued interest in easing tensions via multilateral engagement: “Indonesia is looking 
to establish a new multilateral forum that China will not be able to sabotage through 
diplomatic pressure on client states.“ (Dominguez, 2015)  
According to Sukma (1994), engagement with China within a multilateral framework, 
either through ASEAN or the ASEAN Regional Forum, has been a first preference of 
Indonesia. Leifer (1999b) notes that multilateralism “has been regarded in Jakarta as 
likely to be a more effective instrument for managing relations with a China regarded 
with apprehension and some foreboding.” This can be seen in the case of EAS, where 
                                                          
59 However, Jokowi has been the first to address China’s claims as legally unfounded, see The Straits 
Times (2015). 
60 This is not due to Indonesia’s domestic weaknesses and lack of resources to pursue radical 
transformation, but due to the long-standing underlying principles of Indonesa’s foreign policy in 
Santikajaya (2014). 
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Indonesia supported the inclusion of India and Australia in contrast to Malaysia’s 
proposal of limiting the EAS to the APT countries (Sukma, 1994). Roberts and 
Widyaningsigh (2014), for example, regard Indonesia’s leadership as critical for the 
establishment of the East Asia Summit, as well as persuading the United States and 
Australia to join TAC. 
The establishment of new multilateral frameworks might seem excessive, a non-strategy 
at first glance. However, a web of bi-, tri- and multilateral relations maintained in the 
multiplicity of mechanisms involved is the heart of the idea of “dynamic equilibrium.“61 
With ASEAN expanding its norms of consensus and consultation to the East Asia 
Summit (EAS), ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+) and the Expanded 
ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF), it has sought to ’bind’ powers external to ASEAN in 
non-binding fora, “in which none are dominant and none are excluded,“ says Poling 
(2013). The ’power’ of the ’ASEAN Way’ need necessarily reflect in efficacy of 
conflict management and dispute resolution, but rather on the constraints it puts on 
actors.  
Indonesia has been playing a bigger part in regional conflict mediation since mid-2000s. 
Indonesia has been criticised of being too independent and not taking an interest where 
the country does not have anything to gain, especially when taking ad hoc measures to 
regional conflict management. Yet, despite taking ad hoc measures, Indonesia has still 
stayed committed to the ‘ASEAN Way’ of doing things. However, Indonesia has been 
better at dealing with regional problems that do not concern its national security, 
infringe on its sovereignty or cut off its interests. Still, advocating for peaceful 
resolutions might be the best attraction for the continuance of Indonesia’s hegemony-
building. 
3.3.3 Agenda-setting 
Arguably, Indonesia’s hegemonic capacity to maintain peace is constricted by the 
principle of non-interference, as allowing for mediators inside a country might run the 
risk of infringing the state’s sovereignty. The following chapter will, thus, look at 
Indonesia’s initiatives in trying to stretch the principle of non-interference and promote 
democracy. 
                                                          
61 See Poling (2013).  
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By 2005, Indonesia had managed to finally stabilise the country, hold democratic 
elections and enjoy economic growth. Outcomes of Reformasi also put a demand on 
Indonesia’s foreign policy to reflect the domestic democratic values in foreign relations. 
Already in 2003, Indonesia acted as the chair of the ASEAN Standing Committee, 
submitting the ASEAN Security Community (ASC62) Plan of Action, including the idea 
of ‘flexible engagement’ to be discussed at the II Bali summit. The idea of ‘flexible 
engagement’63 first introduced by Thailand in 1998, re-emerged in the 2000s. Indonesia 
was one of the initial opponents of the Thai proposal (Katsumata, 2003), later becoming 
an advocate of change to the rigid principle of non-interference. Sukma’s Action Plan 
for a Security Community stretched ‘flexible engagement’ to involve state and human 
security instances requiring prevention and resolution measures that were felt as 
infringing on ASEAN member states’ sovereignties (Emmerson, 2005).  
Haacke (2005) indicates that the ‘red line’ was encountered with the proposed 
establishment of a regional peacekeeping force. Moreover, he adds, these capacities 
were regarded as politically and financially demanding. According to Haacke, member 
states felt that “Jakarta was trying de facto to steam-roll ASEAN into embracing a 
discourse and agenda that was not of all members’ choosing. Blaming Jakarta of not 
embracing the ‘ASEAN way’ has not been a single occurrence. In the lead-up to the II 
Bali Concord, the ASEAN People’s Assembly, a think tank in Jakarta, “urged 
transforming ASEAN into a body ‘of the people, by the people, for the people’ of 
Southeast Asia”, indicating an ‘American way’ with reference to Abraham Lincoln’s 
Gettysburg Address rather than the ‘ASEAN’ way (Emmerson, 2005). 
Indonesia’s push for loosening of the non-intervention principle and emphasising 
domestic governance was marked by many as a failure of Indonesia’s leadership. The 
plan was rejected and then accepted as a watered-down version of the original, leading 
Indonesia to feel humiliated.64 Wain cited in Emmers (2014) has argued that “by 
agreeing to a watered-down version of the ASC Plan of Action, having rejected the 
original proposal earlier, some member states also rejected Indonesia as a first among 
                                                          
62 Later renamed as the ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC). 
63 Sometimes also referred to as “constructive intervention“, see Mahathir and Irwan (2007). 
64 This might also be a manifestation of Rizal Sukma’s dissatisfaction with ASEAN and how Indonesia’s 
efforts were disregarded, see chapter titled Sukma’s way in Emmerson (2005). 
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equals within ASEAN.” Anwar (2010) also highlights the ratification of The ASEAN 
Charter and the establishment of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on 
Human Rights (AICHR) in late 2008 and mid-2009, respectively, as watered-down 
versions of Indonesia’s proposals to include provisions on the protection of human 
rights with no provisions for sanctions for non-compliance being adopted.  
This has led Sukma (2012) to accept that, at the moment, Indonesia is still not seen as 
capable enough to promote65 democracy and endorse human rights due to a host of 
domestic problems. Moreover, the reformation of the state system, namely the Foreign 
Ministry of Indonesia, and the emergence of non-governmental organisations, human 
rights groups and academics voicing their opinion have made foreign policy making 
more demanding as well as complex (Nabbs-Keller, 2013). The complexity is especially 
stark in comparison to the era of Suharto, when Indonesia was a strong regional leader, 
yet foreign relations required minimal, if any, consultation due to the nature of the 
authoritarian regime (Sukma, 1995).  
Due to pressure at home, Indonesia’s drive to have human rights on the ‘regional table’ 
has persisted. The Bali Democracy Forum (BDF) introduced in 2008 already saw its 7th 
meeting held last year. BDF is a forum where participants can deliver speeches on what 
democracy means to their countries. Bali Media Forum, a side project will see best 
practices diffused among participating countries to ensure a widespread effect. (Jakarta 
Post, 2014) However, it has been argued whether Indonesia is actually doing something 
or just ‘talking the talk’. And that ‘talk’ is not something that all of the ASEAN 
countries want to hear, leading to accusations of Indonesia only trying to promote their 
own image and not dealing with the needs of the region (Damazo-Santos, 2014). The 
scope of the forum is indeed impressive with 85 representatives having joined the forum 
in 2014 (Jakarta Post, 2014). But the way the forum functions, as a speech festival, 
raises questions as to its efficiency.66 
Indonesia’s hegemonic capacity might not be strong enough for endorsing democracy 
on a wide scale per se, but economic development in terms of assisting new members 
                                                          
65 Sukma distinguishes between the projection of democracy and the promotion of democracy, alluding to 
Indonesia engaging in the normative emptiness of the former (Reid, 2012). 
66 Although, as has been established, the views on success are less product- and process-oriented and 
more long-term. 
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with their economies and delivering economic goods could work well in promoting 
‘pragmatic democracy’ and counterbalancing the Chinese and American economic 
models (Snitwongse, 1998). China’s influence is growing and can be seen in the 
possible polarisation of ASEAN with Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thai and Vietnam, 
countries considered the poorer 5 of the ASEAN 10, choosing China over the United 
States (Menon, 2013). One of the factors would be the differences between the Beijing 
and Washington Consensus. The former adheres to economic authoritarianism, the latter 
to economic neoliberalism. Economy is indeed a powerful driver of policy, yet 
Indonesia is starting to pull its own weight. Indonesia together with Australia have been 
making plans for building up Myanmar’s economic capacity, with the former providing 
a solid example of a successful67 democratic transition.68 Moreover, Indonesia’s silent 
diplomacy69 towards Myanmar has been hailed as triumphing in the region, as military 
reformers and presidential advisors frequent Myanmar to share its experience of 
democratic transition (Vatikiotis, 2012).   
Through ASEAN, Indonesia has tried to lobby for a revision of the non-intervention 
principle closely tied to ASEAN’s ’flexible engagement’ approach. Indonesia has led 
the talks on democracy and the establishment of the ASEAN Human Rights Council 
and the ASEAN Peace and Reconciliation Council. Even though Indonesia’s pro-
democracy initiatives have not been met with great enthusiasm, Indonesia has managed 
to leverage its leadership to an extent where some changes to the formerly rigid 
principles of non-intervention have passed. The efficacy of these new initiatives is not 
evaluated within this thesis, yet the existence of these initiatives is taken as an indicator 
of hegemonic capacity.  
3.3.4 ASEAN centrality 
Indonesia has been feared to abandon its ASEAN-centric focus with the newly elected 
president Jokowi. Jokowi’s focus lies in the global maritime nexus (poros maritime 
dunia) not only for economic, but security reasons, too (Bentley, 2014). Once again, the 
need to protect state sovereignty is emphasised. McCawley (2014), distinguishing 
between an inward-looking ‘resilience path’ and an outward looking ‘reform path’, 
                                                          
67 This does not mean that domestic violence, conflict, insecurities and weaknesses do not persist, yet 
Indonesia’s recovery and resilience have been remarkable. 
68 Ausaid (2015). 
69 For successful silent diplomacy by an upcoming regional hegemon, see Prys (2009). 
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gives prominence in Jokowi’s focus to the former, as the latter is littered with 
substantial obstacles. This follows with Sukma’s (2012) statement that “at present, the 
record suggests that the country’s influence in the global arena remains marginal. 
Indonesia still has a long way to go before it can realise its full potential to matter 
significantly in the global arena.” 
The importance of foreign policy for Jokowi is best seen in comparison with the foreign 
policy of the second candidate for presidency, Prabowo. The latter’s foreign policy 
features the maintenance of politik bebas aktif, an active role in combating global 
warming and protecting Indonesian migrant workers. Jokowi focuses on the 
maintenance of the unity of the archipelagic state, acting as a middle power in different 
fora, expanding and strengthening the regional architecture to include the Asia-Pacific 
and continuing with the facilitation of democratic (and plural) foreign policymaking 
(Santikajaya, 2014). These views are not unsurprising, given Southeast Asia’s “adverse 
historical memories, nationalism and international scape-goating – as a political tool in 
response to weak political legitimacy,” says Roberts (2012). Furthermore, Christopher 
Dent (2012) has suggested that bilateralism70is “more likely to bring division rather than 
inclusion to regional community building endeavours in Southeast Asia over the long 
run.”  
However, Indonesia’s engagement outside of ASEAN channels should not be viewed as 
zero-sum: Indonesia looking beyond ASEAN does not negate its commitment to 
ASEAN. Following the logic of Indonesia’s politik bebas aktif principle, Indonesia has 
signed economic partnerships with Australia, Japan and India71, as these three powers 
do not impose an immediate threat to the regional equilibrium, but help maintain 
stability in asymmetry (Sukma, 1997). Also, the Indonesia-led ASEAN Political and 
Security Community blueprint restates the commitment to ASEAN centrality as “the 
driving force in charting the evolving regional architecture.” (ASEAN Secretariat, 2009) 
As expressed by Haacke (2005), “while ASEAN’s diplomatic and security culture itself 
provides a pillar of regional stability and order in Southeast Asia, this pillar is in many 
ways connected, but also subordinated to, bilateral alliances and relationships, and 
multinational frameworks for security cooperation.” 
                                                          
70 Here in the context of individual countries seeking bilateral agreements. 
71 Indonesia and China do not have a bilateral economic agreement. 
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It might seem that maintaining ‘ASEAN centrality’ is nothing but wishful thinking. Goh 
(2011) states that “unfinished and urgent task of [ASEAN’s] internal consolidation acts 
as an important constraint to ASEAN’s ability to play its brokerage role vis-à-vis the 
great powers and regional order in East Asia.” Internal consolidation of ASEAN via 
institution-building and agenda-setting and also making use of bilateral and multilateral 
commitments with external actors would strengthen ASEAN centrality. Caballero-
Anthony (2014) stresses the necessity of the former, urging ASEAN to work harder on 
building its institutional capacity. Ho (2012) stresses the necessity of the latter, 
“particularly so if ASEAN states – in their proclivity to avoid being drawn into big 
power rivalries – end up adopting an inward-looking, it-is-all-about-ASEAN mentality,” 
arguing that “the interests of ASEAN states would be better served in expanding their 
relational capacities (whether formally or informally) vis-à-vis other regional and global 
partners instead of over-emphasising the centrality of ASEAN.” In the light of this, 
suggestions that Indonesia is turning its back on ASEAN can be countered, for one, by 
analysing the evolving principle of ‘ASEAN centrality’.  
Even though Indonesia has shown at times fickle commitment to ASEAN, Indonesia’s 
costs of non-commitment would see other member states take decisions on matters that 
might inflict on Indonesia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. ‘Keeping ASEAN in 
the centre of multilateral frameworks, commonly referred to as ‘ASEAN centrality’, 
keeps ‘a space’ for great power play and projection from opening up, using an 
“enmeshment” strategy’, as cited in Ho (2012). Understandably, Indonesia cannot 
control other countries’ links to superpowers, yet a zone of neutrality in the region as a 
whole like stated in ZOPFAN works has worked in theory (Weck, 2011).  
’ASEAN centrality’ has always been a key factor in balancing and hedging between 
great powers. Indonesia’s ’free and active’ foreign policy fits well with not providing a 
space for great powers to dominate the region. This leads Beeson (2014), for example, 
to consider ASEAN as „the best hope for continuing stability in the world’s most 
important economic region.“ ASEAN centrality’ is vital, as APEC, EAS and APT, the 
former of which includes ASEAN and the latter two of which are extensions of 
ASEAN, have been seen to overstage ASEAN in areas of practical outcomes. For 
instance, Stubbs (2002) mentions the role of APT in the Asian Financial Crisis as 
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imperative, expressing APT’s potential to emerge as the most important organisation 
reflecting in the juxtaposition of the weakened positions of Japan and Indonesia 
resulting in a lessened interest in regional initiatives. 
Furthermore, Indonesia strongly adheres to the principle of not having any great power 
dominate the region. In his book “Whose ideas matter? Agency and power in Asian 
regionalism”, Acharya (2009) makes a compelling case for the synthesis of the 
cognitive prior of Asia’s colonial past, the Cold War bipolarising pulls and the non-
intervention principle of a Westphalia system of states leading to the underlying notions 
of enhanced non-intervention and non-alignment. The latter has been also reinforced in 
Indonesia’s vision to manage the relations of ASEAN member states independent of 
external interference. The politik bebas aktif (independent and active), the positioning of 
Indonesia between the United States and the Soviet Union by rejecting commitment to 
either bloc (Sukma, 1995), can still be seen today, as Indonesia maintains its position of 
a non-aligned but multilateral actor between, first and foremost, China and the United 
States, while also engaging with Japan, India and Australia. 
Despite talks of looking past ASEAN, operating in a non-ASEAN way and self-
interestedly, Indonesia’s commitment to ASEAN remains strong with ’ASEAN 
centrality’ and the ’ASEAN way’ of doing things being upheld. In the logic of the 
concentric circles introduced first by Colonel Murdani and reiterated by the later ruling 
elites, Indonesia seeks to maintain its security by maintaining an active and 
independent72 role in the region. This coincides with Indonesia’s politik bebas aktif 
principle. What speaks to Indonesia advantage is 50 years of varied experience in 
ASEAN and other multilateral organisations as well as an ASEAN belief that 
commitment to non-binding agreements offers more leeway for the countries not to 
operate in a setting of pre-destined actions, marginalising the more common language of 
conflicts, use of force and war.  
                                                          
72 Independent here is to be understood as not having the connotation of “going at it alone“, but as not 
having powers outside of the region and within it have enough control over Indonesia and its 
development. 
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3.4 Global 
On a global level, Indonesia stands out due to its large Muslim population, its strategic 
position and its freshly minted position among the MINT73 countries. These factors 
have given base for Indonesia’s membership in various international organisations. 
Moreover, Indonesia’s ‘central’ position within ASEAN and the Southeast Asian region 
in general, have seen both China and the United States court it (Scarpello, 2010). 
3.4.1 Engaging China and the United States 
Since the 1990s, and in the case of Indonesia especially after the fall of Suharto in 1997, 
China has been enjoying a more positive response74 from the nations of Southeast Asia. 
Sukma (2009a) points out three focal points in future Sino-Indonesian relations. Firstly, 
the public perception of Indonesian Chinese minority has shown signs of considerable 
improvement after the atrocities of 199875, yet Indonesian Chinese are still at times 
viewed as responsible for corruption and fostering a culture of bribery in Indonesia. 
This prejudice has also been the source of frustration in the relations between Singapore 
and Indonesia (Hamilton-Hart, 2009). Moreover, the case of the 1998 has been side-
lined without conclusive resolution (Sukma, 2009a). However, Sukma notes that China, 
careful not to infringe on Indonesia’s sovereignty, would also see the dilemma handled 
by Indonesia, as to not have to ‘defend its kin’ by breaching Indonesia’s sovereignty. 
Secondly, the continued nurturing of trust between the two countries and, thirdly, the 
resolving of bilateral issues, has had positive effects on the Sino-Indonesian relations.  
Whether China is willing to forego two decades of projecting friendliness and building 
peaceful neighbourly with the nations of Southeast Asia, is another question, relating 
especially to the dispute over the South China Sea islands. However, the Chinese 
‘influence’ on Southeast Asia (and Indonesia) should not be over exaggerated. A staff 
report on China’s economic ties published  in March 2015 suggests that even though the 
‘dependence’ on China has increased in poorer ASEAN countries and decreased in 
richer ones, China has yet to become a big investor in Southeast Asia, with its foreign 
                                                          
73 MINT is a term coined by Jim O’Neill collectively referred to the rising economies of Mexico, 
Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey, see BBC (2014). 
74 Although anti-Chinese sentiments remain, for an overview of Southeast Asian nations’ sentiments 
towards China see Cho and Park (2013). 
75 See The Jakarta Post (1999). 
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direct investment resulting in 2.3% of ASEAN’s total FDI inflows in 2013 
(Parameswaran, 2015a). 
Taking into consideration that Indonesia has enjoyed an improvement in bilateral 
relations with China, yet is unsure of China’s intentions relating to Indonesia’s domestic 
and regional concerns, the latter, according to Sukma (1994), has engaged in a two-tier 
approach of both cooperation and kind of hedging. However, for example, Indonesia did 
not have much of a say in the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA), which has 
caused trade deficit, industrial downturn and rising unemployment, leading Indonesia to 
seek a diversity in its economic partners (Hadi, 2012). “Indonesia has taken a mixed 
approach to economic diplomacy with China. On one hand, it has signed bilateral trade 
agreements with South Korea and Japan but not with China, suggesting—like India—a 
preference for closer trade relations with China’s wealthier neighbors (Salidjanova and 
Koch-Wesner, 2015). 
Relations with China seem to be still plagued by historic distrust which is fuelled by the 
dispute on the South China Sea. Indonesia’s strength has been to engage with China 
both bilaterally and multilaterally, enmeshing China in Southeast Asian institutions, 
hoping to keep peace in the region. 
The United States and Indonesia, similarly to China and Indonesia76, have enjoyed good 
relations underlined by suspicion and distrust. Murphy names Indonesia’s and the 
United States’ shared interests to be counterterrorism, maritime security of the Malacca 
straits, vital for global shipping, and a wariness of a growing China. According to her, 
differences can be found in reactions to the Middle East and the global trade 
(liberalisation). Referring to the former, Indonesia, for example, has supported the 
Palestinian cause, but this has been based on the policy of self-determination, a just 
solution based on the United Nations’ legal framework, not religious solidarity towards 
Muslims, states Sukma in Murphy (2009). Azra (2006:92) describes this as follows: 
“Indonesia’s support for the Palestinian cause is not based on the principle of Islamic 
solidarity, but on humanity.” Smith (2003) further comments that leading Muslim 
parties in Indonesia have urged the people to regard the situation in the Iraq “as a 
political, and not a religious, struggle.” 
                                                          
76 For an overview, see (Sukma, 2009a). 
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The United States as the lead state of the West has shown continued interest in 
Indonesia, trying to encourage the country to adhere to the balance of moderate Islamic 
elements in a stable and democratic environment. Indonesia’s face-saving balancing act 
can be summed up in the words of Hadiz (2004): “Indonesia have needed to match the 
populist appeal of various Islamic-based adversaries–whose social justice rhetoric is 
sometimes virulently anti-American–while simultaneously ensuring continued 
engagement with US-led global economic and security processes.” The United States’ 
and Indonesia’s understanding of democracy differs to the extent that Indonesia has not 
been promoting the American ideological value-based democracy, but has viewed 
democracy as having pragmatic benefits, most notably for the economic growth and 
socio-political cohesion of the country (Murphy, 2009).  
Smith (2003) has referred to Indonesia-U.S. relations as ‘a glass half full’: Indonesia, 
despite being hailed as a ‘poster child’ for US-led democracy, “a critical test case in the 
war against terrorism,” “has continued to challenge the global order (and thus the West 
led by the United States) by seeking to reform the Security Council, urging focusing on 
proliferation of nuclear weapons and adhering to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT).” This is a testament to Indonesia doing things their way. Indonesia, for one, 
cannot be considered a ‘poodle’ of the United States,77 as Indonesia’s support for 
counterterrorism would maybe suggest. For example, Indonesia has never supported the 
wars in Afganistan, Iraq or Iran. Smith (2003) also highlights Indonesia’s opposition to 
post-Gulf war sanctions and a unilateral U.S.-led attack outside the UN mandate against 
Iraq. 
Also, Indonesia cannot afford to be too closely associated with the United States, not 
only because of its ‘independent and active’ policy, but due to China’s perceptions of 
the relationship and Indonesia’s public sphere distrusting (and blaming) the West78 and 
the United States. The latter refers especially to the International Monetary Fund 
bailouts of 1998 seen as ailing rather than aiding Indonesians.79 Indonesia’s sensitivity 
can be further traced to counterclaims to Muslim radicalism, e.g. the initial disbelief of 
                                                          
77 The word ’poodle’ was popularised in the context of U.S.-Great Britain relations in the early 2000s 
with regard to the war against terrorism. Tony Blair was referred to as the poodle of George W. Bush. 
78 Smith (2003) references that Australians and Americans are especially not trusted, as their NGO ’soft 
power’ has been hailed as one of the reasons for the loss of East Timor. 
79 See Smith (2003). 
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Al Qaeda’s involvement in the 9/11 attacks, the dismissal of Muslim radicals operating 
in Indonesia as CIA rumours80. Smith (2003) further notes that suspicion remains even 
among Muslim moderates as to what are the United States’ intentions regarding the 
Muslim world. Murphy (2009) counters by saying that anti-Americanism is not as 
deeply rooted as one might think and can be altered by circumstance. 
However, it is true that the United States still want Indonesia ‘on their side’ or at least 
‘not on someone else’s side’, the latter here most commonly referring to China. Even 
though not readily agreeing with the United States on a number of different issues, 
Indonesia has been a responsible member in international relations abiding by the 
decisions taken by the UN Security Council. This is exemplified by Indonesia 
reluctantly accepting the UN resolution on a trade embargo on Iraq after the Kuwait 
invasion (Suryadinata, 1995). Indonesia’s commitment to international law and large 
Muslim population situated in a geostrategic area near maritime ways of immense 
importance will see to Indonesia’s glass remaining ‘half full’ from the United States’ 
point of view.  
With the United States’ ‘pivot to Asia’ capacity weakened due to budgetary cuts 
(Freyer-Briggs, 2014), the United States would arguably more likely greet a strong 
regional leader in Indonesia than see its own direct presence in the region. The last 
remark comes with a caveat, as the United States has been seen to ramp up its anti-
China pivot (Symonds, 2015). This fits well with the U.S. hub and spokes system, with 
the U.S. leading from afar as the hub via strategic partnerships and allies as its spokes. 
And, although, Indonesia is treading carefully not to upset the Chinese or the 
Americans, recent purchases of military equipment from the U.S. might be indicative of 
Indonesia trying to balance the growing militarism in the region (Tomkins, 2015).  
Thus far, Indonesia has managed to hedge between the external powers, seeking out the 
United States when the Chinese influence on the region grows and vice versa. From the 
point of view of a regional hegemon, Indonesia has played to its strengths and tried to 
enmesh the two external actors as well as undercut balance of power type of thinking. 
                                                          
80 This comment alluding to the CIA spreading rumours comes from Rachmawati Sukarnoputri, sister of 
the president Megawati Sukarnoputri cited in Smith (2003). 
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However, Indonesia’s weakness lies in the growing militarism in the region translating 
into military action. 
3.4.2 Global institutions 
On a global level, Indonesia enjoys a membership in the Organisation of Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC) and in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Even though 
Indonesia’s Islam is at times viewed as ‘peripheral’ and it does not have economic or 
geographic leverage in the OIC, its commitment to human rights meant that Indonesia 
became the first host of the Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission 
(IPHRC) of the OIC (Wahyuningrum and Hafiz, 2012). Indonesia has showcased its 
leadership skills before, for example, more recently by chairing OIC’s Peace Committee 
for Southern Philippines (Santos, 2015). Rosyadi translated in Suryadinata (1995) has 
made note of Indonesia’s unique position in the OIC, also having mediated conflicts in 
and between OIC members themselves. Unsurprisingly, Indonesia has been called upon 
this year to settle the conflict in Yemen (Xiunhua Net, 2015), indicating the appeal of 
Indonesia’s approach to foreign policy, more specifically, its conflict management.  
A large Muslim population has ensured its place in the OIC, yet Indonesia has been 
adamant at participating in the organisation on the principles of the UN charter and the 
1945 Constitution, signifying the non-Islamic nature of Indonesia’s foreign policy 
(Suryadinata, 1995). Indonesia has also held firm on the non-alignment principle in 
NAM, not wishing to link any political or religious disputes in states with a Muslim 
population to the organisation. For example, during the Bosnia Crisis, Indonesia 
maintained its disengagement with a co-religious image of helping the Bosnian 
Muslims, only agreeing to send troops to the area when requested by the United Nations 
to do so (Suryadinata, 1995).  
This ‘middle path’ approach has to a greater extent characterised Indonesia’s 
policymaking. As the first ASEAN country to have been invited to join the G2081,82 
Indonesia has regarded this opportunity as a ‘civilisational’ platform to fulfil its role as 
a bridge between democratic and Islamic values (Lutfi, 2014). Moreover, Indonesia has 
                                                          
81 The Group of Twenty refers to the 20 largest economies in the world. 
82 The G20 has failed to legitimately answer the question of how countries are invited to join this 
exclusive economic club, see Patrick (2010) for an overview of the possible criteria. These suspicions 
spill over to Indonesia’s admittance, as its level of per capita income is still lower than that of other 
ASEAN countries such as Thailand and Malaysia in Indonesia in G20. 
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been given support by regional leaders in Southeast Asia to represent ASEAN in the 
G20.83 For this purpose, the ASEAN G20 Contact Group was set up during the 15th 
ASEAN Summit to coordinate regional interests and positions prior to G20 summits 
(Weck, 2011). 
One could argue that with Indonesia engaged in different institutions and fora, it not 
only enjoys an increased international standing, but the commitments made in these 
institutions also help in focusing the country on improvement, signalling a responsible 
Indonesia to its regional audience. This is illustrated, for instance, by Indonesia in G20 
focusing on fiscal transparency, reducing corruption, managing its public debt84, 
promotion of stability in financial markets and good governance (Weck, 2011). 
Moreover, Indonesia as one of the developing countries in G20 has been coordinating a 
common voice with other developing countries, ensuring a better bargaining position in 
an institution dominated mostly by structural power.85 The South-South cooperation 
was further emphasised by President Jokowi during the last Afro-Asian Conference 
(Parameswaran, 2015b). Despite lacking in structural power, Indonesia has managed to 
propose or gather support for initiatives relating to gas emission and executive honour 
pay reduction, a global expenditure fund creation, among others (Weck, 2011).  
Garnaut (2012) states that Indonesia’s international political culture has helped shape 
the inelegant process of trade liberalisation. He also mentions that without the support 
of ‘Indonesia and ASEAN for the continued discussion on the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) and the culture of collective decision-making influenced by 
Indonesia, APEC would not be as successful.’ He agrees to this sense of freedom 
leading to a more active role in taking the necessary measures for the implementation of 
the necessary trade liberalisation reforms. This also shows some fading of Indonesia’s 
economic nationalism, highlighting at the same time its wish to formulate a new 
economic culture adhering to Indonesia’s own wants. This is illustrated by Jokowi’s 
recent call for a non-Western economic order at the 60th anniversary celebrations for 
the Asia–Africa (Bandung) conference (Camroux, 2015). Chatib (2012) agrees that 
                                                          
83 This promotion of ASEAN in the G20 via Indonesia was also emphasised in 2011 when Indonesia took 
to chair ASEAN in Weck (2011).  
84 In 1997/98 the public and private debt amounted to 100% over GDP in Weck (2011). 
85 The larger the per capita income, the more powerful the country. 
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“resistance to market reform from protectionist groups continues and it would be 
unwise to assume that pressure for trade protection will subside any time soon,” 
referring to the supply-side constrains and complexity of democratic policy-making. 
Basri and Hill (2011), however, maintain that Indonesia cannot backtrack, as it already 
participates in international trade agreements and, secondly, would not want to miss out 
in the face of competitive liberalisation.  
A more responsible image is not only projected through Indonesia’s promotion of 
democracy and engagement in global economy, but also in non-security areas of policy, 
for instance, climate and environmental policies. In 2007, Indonesia hosted the 
Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. Jotzo (2012) indicates a strong interest in leading global talks, as “the country 
is highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change.” He notes that, although, BASIC 
(Brazil, South Africa, India and China) still dictate the global agenda, Indonesia has 
contributed in the formation of the Bali Roadmap, ‘the principles of which still 
reverberate in the ongoing climate discussions.’ With a country as large as Indonesia, 
showcasing its environmental responsibility is a win-win for both the country itself and 
the regional (and global) environment. 
Indonesia’s international role is best viewed through regional and global engagement. 
Indonesia as a pivotal state enjoys being courted by both the United States and China 
and has sought bilateral partnerships with India, Japan and Australia to further ’enmesh’ 
great powers and reconfirm its commitment to non-alignment, also being a member of 
the Non-Aligned Movement. Indonesia’s role in the G20 has further re-emphasised its 
growing commitment to comprehensive security by tackling economic issues and 
facilitating South-South relations. Having the world’s largest Muslim population living 
in a democratic country has offered Indonesia leverage in the OIC and issues relating to 
counterterrorism. Even reluctantly, Indonesia has still always upheld UN principles and 
appealed to the supremacy of international law, making it a responsible actor. Indonesia 
is also active in the fight against climate change and, although, the global agenda is still 
dominated by BASIC countries, Indonesia is eager to play a bigger part. 
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4. Results 
4.1 Domestic level 
Indonesia’s constitution and principles of Pancasila reinforcing diplomasi, consultation 
and consensus together with the principles of politik bebas aktif and the discourse on 
Indonesia’s exceptionalism as the primus inter pares of Southeast Asia provide a basis 
for strong ideational capacity. The ‘active and independent’ foreign policy has urged 
Indonesia to take an active part in foreign relations; this has been further supported by 
the feeling of being the ‘first among equals’. The latter two have also strengthened 
Indonesia’s commitment to regional and global affairs, serving as an international 
capacity.  
However, the feeling of vulnerability, stemming from the historic legacy of Indonesia’s 
colonial rule and the country having fought for its independence, can be seen reiterated 
time and time again in concentric self-interest circles that have the country looking 
inward when its sovereignty and territorial integrity are threatened. The domestic 
capacity of Indonesia is considerably weakened due to problems stemming from its 
archipelagic nature (at the same time its strategic position is considered to increase its 
international capacity). Due to poor policing capacities, maintaining national and 
territorial unity has been difficult. The weak domestic capacity combined with the 
ideational capacity of concentric circles has also served to weaken the international 
capacity. This is seen in Indonesia withdrawing and acting in an unfriendly way, most 
notably in the cases involving illegal fishing and human trafficking which Indonesia 
answered to with strict measures.  
Indonesia’s domestic capacity is strengthened by the continued improvement of 
democratic mechanisms in nation-building. Indonesia’s domestic capacity relating to 
democracy has also helped boost international capacity, with the United States, 
especially, favouring a strong moderate Muslim state, Indonesia, as democratic. Seeing 
that economic growth is the basis for continued support for democracy by the people 
and also a source of Indonesia’s heightened role in global affairs, relating respectively 
to the domestic and international capacity, economic nationalism can be seen to hinder 
this growth, thus having a negative effect in all of the three capacities. Caveats exist to 
maintaining the economic growth in ensuring improved territorial and socio-political 
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cohesion and building human capacity. Low socio-political cohesion, worries of 
separatism and remaining issues, such as corruption relating to the democratic polity 
serve to further weaken the domestic capacity. Low socio-political cohesion has also 
raised worries as to growing Muslim radicalism, especially in the light of the rise of 
ISIS, undermining the international capacity. 
4.2 Regional 
Indonesia’s high ideational capacity on the regional level relates to the adherence to the 
‘ASEAN Way’, a continuation of the domestic foreign policy principles of diplomasi 
and muswarah, and also in the principles of non-interference, non-use of force and non-
alignment introduced in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and reinforced in the 
Declaration of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality. Adherence to TAC and 
ZOPFAN and the code of conduct related to the ‘ASEAN Way’ also show a responsible 
Indonesia, increasing its international capacity. 
Ever since mid-2000s, Indonesia has been increasingly active in the region and 
especially within ASEAN. This can be seen in Indonesia mediating conflicts in ASEAN 
and between ASEAN and non-ASEAN regional actors. Mediating conflicts has been a 
strength of Indonesia in that by mostly taking ad hoc measures, peace has been retained 
in the region. However, due to this so-called ‘shuttle diplomacy’, Indonesia’s 
international capacity with regard to ASEAN has seen a decrease, as members have 
criticised Indonesia for only taking an interest in mediation when its own interests are 
not at risk.  
Similarly to the domestic level, on the regional level, democracy is both a strength and a 
weakness. Reformasi put pressure on Indonesia to reflect its democratic values in 
foreign policy, thus Indonesia argued for ‘flexible engagement’ and the introduction of 
a regional peacekeeping force. Many non-democratic ASEAN member states felt that 
Indonesia was disregarding the region’s ‘ways’. What Indonesia got were watered-down 
documents of proposals that still featured provisions on the protection of human rights. 
Democracy and the resulting lobbying for the introduction of more democratic 
principles to ASEAN can be viewed as a weakness in the domestic capacity, the 
ideational capacity and the international capacity. However, the more pragmatic 
domestic capacity of democracy promotion through ‘silent diplomacy’ can be seen as a 
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promising international capacity, namely in Indonesia engaging Myanmar. Moreover, 
not assessing its efficacy, the Bali Democracy Forum, even though not a direct strength 
for Indonesia’s ideational capacity, has seen international capacity rise thanks to 
countries external to the region appreciating the ‘talk shop’.  
Despite worries about Indonesia’s commitment, slightly decreasing the international 
capacity of Indonesia within ASEAN, Indonesia has maintained an ASEAN-centric 
focus. Maintaining ‘ASEAN centrality’ has not only alleviated fears of Indonesia ‘going 
at it alone’, but also helped Indonesia in balancing and hedging between great powers, 
increasing its international as well as ideational capacity in keeping ASEAN at the 
forefront as other members would also have it. 
4.3 Global 
On the global level, distrust towards external actors might at first glance decrease the 
international capacity to engage external actors, yet Indonesia’s distrust has seen an 
increase in international capacity with the continued commitment to hedge and balance 
between the United States and China. Indonesia’s continued participation in the Non-
Aligned Movement adds to the international capacity of Indonesia to maintain this 
(dis)equilibrium. Indonesia’s economic growth, despite economic nationalism, has 
earned it a spot at the G20 table and increased it international capacity also in the eyes 
of other ASEAN states, as Indonesia is taken to represent the whole of ASEAN. Being 
part of the G20 has also meant that economic nationalism would be difficult to 
maintain, as backtracking from agreements would prove difficult. Its large Muslim 
population sees its international capacity further expanded by membership and a role as 
a mediator in the OIC. Commitment to human rights has fared better on the global level, 
as Indonesia became the first host of the Independent Permanent Human Rights 
Commission of the OIC. Furthermore, Indonesia has always adhered to the UN 
principles, increasing its international capacity. In general, Indonesia’s active 
participation in numerous global institutions has raised its international capacity, 
however, the effects of Indonesia’s participation have been marginal. 
 
The discussion of empirics gathered on the three levels has been presented in the 
following tables: 
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STRENGTHS OF INDONESIA'S HEGEMONY-BUILDING 
Domestic capacity Ideational capacity International capacity 
archipelagic state 
 
of interest to many due to 
geostrategic position (G) 
 
primus inter pares 
active participation in 
international affairs (G/R) 
 
politik bebas aktif 
non-alignment with any great 
powers (R) 
 
diplomasi, muswarah, 
TAC, ZOPFAN 
adherence to the ASEAN Way 
shows responsibility (R) 
 
non-alignment NAM (G) 
 
ASEAN centrality mediating conflicts (R) 
 
democracy (values) Bali Democracy Forum (G) 
 
democracy (values) 
an exemplary state for other 
Muslim states (G) 
democracy (pragmatic) [democracy (values)] 
silent diplomacy, e.g. engaging 
Myanmar (R) 
large Muslim population human rights 
participating, mediating 
conflicts in OIC (G) 
 
UN principles 
adherence to the UN principles 
shows responsibility (G/R) 
  
engagement in G20, 
representing ASEAN (G/R) 
 
vulnerability manifested 
in distrust 
hedging between external actors 
has not seen a decrease in 
international capacity (G) 
 WEAKNESSES OF INDONESIA'S HEGEMONY-BUILDING 
Domestic capacity Ideational capacity International capacity 
archipelagic state 
vulnerability expressed in 
thinking in concentric 
circles 
looking inward, neglecting 
benign conduct (G/R) 
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low socio-political cohesion 
 
feared Muslim radicalism (G/R) 
economic growth 
maintenance economic nationalism 
possible negative effect to 
engagement in G20 (R) 
 
democracy (values) 
democratic principles put forth 
not accepted or accepted as 
watered-down versions of initial 
proposals (R) 
  
ad hoc measures, selective 
commitment to conflict 
mediation (R) 
 
democracy (values) 
Bali Democracy Forum viewed 
as sidestepping the region (R) 
Table 1. R stands for regional level, G stands for global level, indicating on which level 
the international capacity has or has not manifested. 
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Conclusion 
Having gathered data on the three levels of analysis – domestic, regional and global – I 
have presented my findings in Table 1. 
The case study shows that Indonesia’s domestic capacity is weak, as the strengths and 
weaknesses both stem from the polity of the state, the ongoing consolidation of 
democratic mechanisms and tackling low socio-political cohesion. Indonesia has a large 
ideational capacity and enjoys a quantitatively large international capacity, yet this, too, 
is undermined by the democratic consolidation still in progress. Regarding Indonesia’s 
domestic capacity in the form of democracy, despite allowing for leverage on the global 
stage, it has not been able to take the necessary ideational measurements on the regional 
level. This is most notably exemplified by the pragmatic democracy used in silently 
engaging Myanmar working better than region-wide proposals that have not been 
accepted in their original form. Similarly, international and ideational capacity have 
seen a decrease in light of domestic turbulence, resulting in Indonesia withdrawing or 
acting non-benignly.  
Based on the findings it can be concluded that changes in domestic capacity result in 
weakened projection of the ideational and international capacity, both on the regional 
and global level. Lack of capacity echoes a lack of commitment to hegemony-building. 
This finding reinforces the need for a domestic level analysis of regional powers and 
would-be regional hegemons. 
However, Indonesia cannot afford to withdraw from the region, despite enjoying more 
international capacity on the global than on the regional level. Historic antagonisms and 
location manifesting itself in vulnerability have seen Indonesia look inward, yet this 
distrust has resulted in Indonesia actively engaging the region and external actors, so as 
not to have the region torn apart by external powers. The ideational capacity 
compatibility with that of the international capacity relating to the Southeast Asian 
region is stronger still than the ideational-international capacity compatibility on the 
global level, the biggest hindrance to the latter comes from economic nationalism. 
However, initiatives, such as the Bali Democracy Forum, show that the weak 
democratic political culture has left the regional actors dissatisfied, yet global actors 
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have welcomed the ideational capacity of democracy and seen it translated into an 
international one. This can be explained by a difference in ideational capacity and 
international capacity across the two levels of regional and global. International capacity 
is shown to be quantitatively stronger than international capacity on the regional level. 
Based on the findings it can be concluded that on the regional level Indonesia’s 
international capacity tends to be associated with Indonesia’s domestic capacity; on the 
global level Indonesia’s international capacity is viewed from the point of view of 
ideational capacity. In conclusion, seeing that ideational capacity is the strongest and 
domestic capacity the weakest, it follows that global actors are more likely to legitimise 
Indonesia’s hegemony-building strengths and weaknesses than regional actors.  
In order to adequately analyse regional hegemonies, a step should be taken back to 
analyse the embryonic capacities of hegemony-building. This allows to count for the 
‘capacity-expectations’ gap experienced by regional powers. Regional powers, 
especially in the Global South, are still in the process of nation- and polity-building, 
indicating that only by accounting for the domestic as well as the regional and global 
level of analysis can capacity and the resulting commitment to hegemony-building be 
assessed. 
Further research can include comparing hegemony-building capacities between a small 
and emerging regional power, as both small and emerging regional powers can exhibit 
relational power in sectoral issues. Even though not directly accounting for legitimation 
by others, Pedersen’s three reformulated capacities serve as a good basis for further 
analysis of regional hegemony-building. 
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Eestikeelne kokkuvõte 
Antud magistritöö uurimusküsimuseks on Indoneesia nõrkade ja tugevate külgede välja 
selgitamine regionaalse hegemoonia ehitamisel. Hegemooniat on uuritud globaalsel 
tasandil, jättes seejuures märkimata regionaalseid võime puudutavad eripärad. 
Hegemoonia diskursus on kontseptuaalselt ‘ülerahvastatud’, kuid pakub aluse antud 
magistritöös käsitletud mõiste ‘hegemoonia’ kontseptualiseerimiseks hegemooni kui 
liidrina. 
Uurimustöö teooria osas on kasutatud Pederseni (2002) kolme hegemoonia 
saavutamiseks vajaminevat eelduskapatsiteeti, mille autor on formuleerinud vastavalt: 
siseriiklik, väärtus- ja normidepõhine ja rahvusvaheline kapatsiteet. Siseriiklik 
kapatsiteet on tuletatud regionaalse võimu võimalikest siseriiklikest nõrkustest ja 
tugevustest, mida globaalse hegemoonia puhul harva uuritakse. Väärtus- ja 
normidepõhine kapatsiteet laseb eeldada legitimeerivaid suhteid võimaliku hegemoonia 
ja ta alluvate vahel, juhul kui väärtused mõlema osapoole vahel kattuvad. Seejuures pole 
oluline täielik legitimatsioon, vaid habermaslikus käsitluses võivad alluvad hegemooni 
ka osaliselt legitimeerida. Rahvusvaheline kapatsiteet viitab rahvusvahelisel areenil, nii 
regionaalsel kui ka globaalsel tasandil, konfliktide lahendamises, teemade päevakorda 
tõstatamises ja erinevate rahvusvaheliste tegutsejate ja organisatsioonidega koostööd 
tehes kaasa rääkimisele. 
Indoneesia uurimiseks on autor kasutanud kolme tasandi analüüsi. Tasanditeks on 
siseriiklik, regionaalne ja globaalne tasand. Empiiria on kogutud esmastest ja teisestest 
allikatest, keskendudes julgeolekuküsimustele antud kolmel tasandil. 
Empiiriast selgus, et Indoneesial esineb siseriiklikke probleeme, mis tulenevad ta 
asukohast, saareriigi iseloomust, mis omakorda põhjustab sotsiaalse ja territoriaalse 
jaotuvuse, ajalooliselt eripärast näha end ohustatuna ja demokraatlikule riigikorrale 
ülemineku jätkumisest. Regionaalsel tasandil on Indoneesia mänginud aktiivset rolli 
regionaalsete konfliktide lahendamises, demokraatlike põhimõtete propageerimises ja 
suurvõimude tasakaalustamises. 50 aastat Kagu-Aasia Rahvaste Assotsiatsioonis 
(ASEAN) tagab Indoneesiale keskse koha organisatsioonis, ka organisatsioonile 
iseloomulikud käitumismehhanismid ja –normid on internaliseeritud. Globaalsel 
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tasandil  kuulub Indoneesia Mitteühinemisliikumisse, Islami Koostöö Organisatsiooni ja 
G20, globaalsete majanduslikult võimekate riikide hulka. Indoneesial on õnnestunud 
siiamaani ka edukalt Hiina ja Ameerika Ühendriikide, kahe regiooni suurvõimu vahel 
tasakaalustada. 
Töö analüüsist selgub, et Indoneesia siseriiklik kapatsiteet on nõrk ning ka regionaalsel 
tasandil pole, vaatamata suurele normidepõhilisele kapatsiteedi ühtivusele, 
märkimisväärset rahvusvahelist kapatsiteeti. Globaalsel tasandil on rahvusvahelise 
kapatsiteedi mõju marginaalne, kuid kapatsiteet on kvantitatiivselt suurem. Tööst 
järeldub, et hegemooniaks pürgimisel peab eelkõige siseriiklik kapatsiteet tugev olema; 
normidepõhise ja rahvusvahelise kapatsiteedi olemasolu pole oluline, kui siseriiklikult 
puudub võimekus selle projitseerimiseks. 
Kuigi Pederseni 3 reformuleeritud kapatsiteeti ei vaata hegemooniat teistest (ja nende 
legitimatsioonist) lähtuvalt, on nad heaks aluseks regionaalsete võimude uurimiseks, et 
tabada nõrkusi ja tugevusi hegemooniks pürgimisel. 
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